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EXTENDING CONSORTIUM RIGHTS TO
UNMARRIED COHABITANTS
INTRODUCTION
During the decade of the 1970s, the number of couples living
in unmarried cohabitation arrangements increased more than
twofold.' The increase in the frequency of unmarried cohabitation
has led to a flurry of cases challenging the traditional view of non-
marital unions. 2 The law, in turn, has been experiencing the pains
of readjustment and accommodation as it attempts to respond to a
changing social reality through legal recognition of these relation-
ships.
This Comment addresses the issue whether unmarried cohab-
itants 3 may recover for loss of consortium owing to tortious con-
duct 4  Consortium refers to the legally protected "relational
interest" that one person acquires by virtue of his or her position
with respect to another family member.5 An interference with
this relational interest can be redressed through a tort action. 6 The
I In 1979, there were approximately 2,692,000 partners living in unmarried
cohabitation arrangements-defined as any household in which two unmarried people
of the opposite sex reside-more than twice the estimated 1,046,000 unmarried
cohabitants living in the United States in 1970. Meanwhile, the number of married
couples increased by only seven percent during these same nine years. U.S. BuRuAu
Or TBE CENsus, DEP'T or CoMMERcE, SERIEs P-20, No. 350, PoPuLAIoN PROFu
or mm UNrrx STATES: 1979, at 8 (1980) [hereinafter cited as POPULATION
PoFnua]. See In re Cary: A Judicial Recognition of Illicit Cohabitation, 25
HAsTncs LJ. 1226, 1226 & n.1 (1974).
2 See Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078, 1080 (D.N.J. 1980) (collect-
ing cases).
3 The Restatement (Second) of Torts refers to a spouse who has suffered the
actual physical injury as the "impaired" spouse; the other spouse, who suffers from
loss of consortium, is referred to as the "deprived" spouse. ESwTATEMNT (SEcoND)
oF ToRTs § 693, Comment a (1977) [hereinafter cited as TORTS REsTATEiMENT].
This Comment will, in addition to adopting this terminology, also use the similar
terms "impaired" and "deprived" cohabitant
4 Although many of the arguments advanced in this Comment might logically
be extended to support the granting of consortium rights to homosexual couples,
numerous distinctions might be made as well. In any case, discussion of the exten-
sion of consortium rights to homosexual couples is beyond the scope of this Comment
1W. 1nosst, HAiDBooK OF T=E LAW OF TORTS 873 (4th ed. 1971). "Con-
sortium" comprises a variety of elements, including services, sexual relations, com-
panionship, affection, and emotional support. See note 32 infra & accompanying
text. Throughout this Comment, the term "consortium interest" will be used to
refer to the existence of the various elements of consortium between a couple; the
term "consortium rights" refers to the legal protection of the consortium interest.
6 Tort remedies have been fashioned for both intentional and negligent inter-
ferences with consortium interests. ToRTs R SATEMENT, supra note 3, at § 693(1)
& Comment b. See W. Paossma, supra note 5, at 873-78.
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United States District Court for the District of New Jersey recently
extended the reach of this relational interest by granting consor-
tium rights to unmarried partners in Bulloch v. United States.7
This Comment examines the Bulloch decision and its potential
impact on consortium law. After a brief discussion of the history
of the consortium doctrine, the Comment explores some of the
cases dealing with the consortium doctrine and unmarried part-
ners. In part If, the Comment traces the changing attitudes of the
United States Supreme Court and of various state courts towards
the institution of marriage, noting the development of a pragmatic
and functional approach towards nontraditional domestic relation-
ships that supports the extension of consortium rights to unmarried
cohabitants. The Comment then "discusses traditional principles
of tort law and demonstrates that these principles support the recog-
nition of consortium rights for unmarried cohabitants. Finally, the
Comment proposes a procedure whereby the claims of all deprived
cohabitants-married or unmarried-may be fairly heard, taking into
account both the state interest in marriage and the interest in com-
pensating all victims who are tortiously injured.
Before turning to this analysis, however, a thorough discussion
of the district court's landmark decision in Bulloch v. United
States" is necessary.9 In Bulloch, the court confronted the difficult
issue whether a loss of consortium claim could be asserted under
New Jersey law in the absence of a legal marital relationship. David
Bulloch had been severely injured in a scuba diving accident. The
accident required him to undergo several months of hospitalization
and rehabilitation and rendered him incapable of having sexual
relations. He brought a tort suit against the federal government,
as his employer, under a federal statute. Edith Bulloch, the woman
with whom David had been cohabiting prior to the suit, joined
David in his federal suit and sought damages for loss of consortium.10
The federal government moved to dismiss Edith's claim, asserting
that legal marriage was a required element of proof in a consor-
tium action.1" Rejecting this argument on policy grounds, the
court denied the government's motion to dismiss. 12
7487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.NJ. 1980).
8Id.
9 Note that two 1980 decisions have discussed the consortium rights of persons
who were not married at the time of the relevant accident. See Chiesa v. Rowe,
486 F. Supp. 236 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165 (Me. Sup.
Jud. Ct. 1980); text accompanying notes 48-55 infra.
10 487 F. Supp. at 1079.
11 Id.
121d. 1088.
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The facts of the Bulloch case are concededly remarkable.
David and Edith Bulloch had had a long and stable relationship, as
both married and unmarried cohabitants. They had been married
to one another for twenty-three years and had raised two children
together. Although the Bullochs were divorced after three years-
of marital discord, a reconciliation quickly followed. At the time
of the accident, the couple had agreed to resume living together
and, ultimately, to remarry. For the nearly three years between
the accident and the trial, the Bullochs had cohabited and had held
themselves out to the community as husband and wife.13 Appar-
ently, they had failed to formalize their marriage only because of
David's sexual impotence.
In examining Edith Bulloch's claim, Judge Ackerman first noted
that no previous decision in New Jersey or any other jurisdiction
had considered whether a legal marriage was a prerequisite for a
loss of consortium action.14 The district court also stated that non-
marital arrangements were becoming increasingly common. Be-
cause of rapidly changing societal conduct and social mores, the
court noted that the legal status of unmarried cohabitants was in
flux.' ,
The Bulloch court found that unmarried cohabitation was
probably a legally recognized relationship under New Jersey law.'6
In Kozlowski v. Kozlowski 7 the New Jersey Supreme Court had
enforced an implied contract between unmarried partners. In the
state court's earlier decision in State v. Saunders,"" moreover, the
state fornication statute was held to be an unconstitutional inva-
sion of adults' right to privacy. Saunders expressly rejected the
argument that a proper purpose of the criminal statute was to pro-
tect the marital relationship and the public morals:
[D]ecisions such as whether to marry are of a highly per-
sonal nature; they neither lend themselves to official coer-
cion or sanction, nor fall within the regulatory power of
those who are elected to govern .... To the extent that
.. . [the fornication statute] serves as an official sanction
of certain conceptions of desirable lifestyles, social mores
13 Note, therefore, that at the time of the accident, the Bullochs were not
cohabiting-they had merely agreed to resume cohabiting. Between the accident
and the trial, however, the Bulloehs had resumed their cohabiting relationship. Id,
1081.
14 Id. 1079.
15 Id. 1080.
16 Id. 1085.
17 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979).
1875 NJ. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977).
1981]
914 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
or individualized beliefs, it is not an appropriate exercise
of the police power. 19
Judge Ackerman interpreted these New Jersey decisions as refusals
by the state courts to regulate private morality or to deny judicial
remedies on the basis of a moral judgment concerning the sexual
behavior of nonmarital partners.
2
0
Given this general background, the district court reasoned that
state courts would deem that a person's marital status is irrelevant
to a consortium claim. Because "the purpose of tort law is to
compensate the people whose injuries are proximately caused by
tortious conduct[,] . . . concepts of reward and punishment related
to a person's marital state are irrelevant to a consideration of who
is entitled to compensation." 21 The court also stated that the New
Jersey courts had recently articulated a strong policy of expanding
tort liability to compensate all those who are injured.22  Because
an unmarried cohabitant can suffer damage identical to that suf-
fered by a married spouse when a mate is injured,23 policy con-
siderations were held to mandate recognition of a loss of consor-
tium claim for such unmarried partners. Thus, Judge Ackerman
deemed the state policy in favor of the institution of marriage 2
outweighed by the state policy of compensating tort victims fully
for any actual injury incurred.2 5
With the preceding background, this Comment's analysis of
the soundness of Bulloch's extension of consortium rights to un-
married cohabitants can begin.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSORTIUM DOCTRINE
A. Historical Background
The historical development of consortium rights for marital
partners has reflected the evolving conception of marriage, as well
as an evolving attitude towards the relative rights of husband and
wife. At common law, a husband acquired a quasi-proprietary in-
terest in his wife's services, by virtue of the marital relationship;
19 Id. at 219, 381 A.2d at 342 (footnote omitted).
20 487 F. Supp. at 1082-87.
211d. 1084.
22 Id. 1084-85.
23 Id. 1085. See note 130 infra.
24 See notes 107-10 infra & accompanying text.
25 487 F. Supp. at 1085-86. See text accompanying notes 21 & 22 supra.
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the wife's status was, in effect, one of a valuable but socially inferior
servant.26 Any interference with the husband's property right in
his wife's services, by way of negligent or intentional injury to her,
gave rise to a loss of consortium claim by the husband.27 Given
this view of marital roles and duties, loss of services gradually be-
came the gist of loss of consortium actions and remained an indis-
pensable element of such claims until relatively recently.28
Saddled with the inequities of the common law conception of
marriage, historically the wife was not granted a comparable tort
remedy if injury to her husband interfered with her consortium
interest. 29 The master-servant model of marital relations relegated
the wife to a socially inferior position and precluded her from hav-
ing any legal entitlement to the services of her husband. As Black-
stone explained, "the inferior hath no kind of property in the
company, care, or assistance of the superior, as the superior is held
to have in those of the inferior; and therefore the inferior can
suffer no loss or injury." 30 In addition, numerous procedural diffi-
culties prevented the wife from asserting a consortium claim.31
26See Hyde v. Scyssor, 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (K.B. 1620); Guy v. Livesay, 79
Eng. Rep. 428 (K.B. 1619); W. PossES, supra note 5, at 873 & n.62; Note, Con-
ceived in Inequality-The Consortium Doctrine: Constitutional Challenges Must Be
Made, 12 NEw ENcLAND L. REv. 135, 138 (1976).
27 Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 Mxcsr. L. REv. 1, 2
(1923).
2 8 See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Goodman, 62 Pa. 329, 339 (1869) (in a
husband's loss of consortium action, "the pecuniary loss was to be measured by the
nature of the [wife's] service"). See generally W. PnossEz, supra note 5, at 874.
One student commentator has concluded that the services concept of consortium
developed because of the ease with which courts could compute damages; although
society, comfort, and conjugal affection were originally included among consortium
interests, these intangible interests were considered too vague and uncertain to be
valued. Comment, The Negligent Impairment of Consortium-A Time For Recog-
nition as a Cause of Action in Texas, 7 ST. MAny's LJ. 864, 867 (1976).
29 The wife could not bring a loss of consortium action in any American juris-
diction until 1950. Although two jurisdictions had held otherwise before 1950, these
decisions were promptly overruled. Hipp v. E.L Dupont de Nemours & Co., 182
N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921), overruled, Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C.
120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925); Griffin v. Cincinnati Realty Co., 27 Ohio Dec. 585
(Cincinnati Super. Ct. 1913), overruled, Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St.
101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915). Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), was the landmark decision unequivocally granting
a loss of consortium action to wives.
303 W. BLAcmrSoN, CoMEsrTrAnms *142-*43. One English jurist, Lord
Campbell, disagreed with the Blackstone analysis and stated that consortium rights
should extend to wives. Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 859-60 (H.L. 1861).
This view, however, was not adopted by a majority of the English courts.
31 At common law, a wife was required to join her husband as a plaintiff in
any lawsuit she instigated. A husband was also entitled to all proceeds of any suit
brought by either the husband or his wife. See, e.g., Wolf v. Bauereis, 72 Md. 481,
1981]
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As the common law conception of marriage began to recognize
equality between the sexes, the services concept of the consortium
interest lost judicial support. The broader, modem definition of
consortium rights encompasses not only spousal services, but also
the intangible elements of the marital relationship, including com-
panionship, emotional support, and conjugal affection.32
Despite these changes in consortium law, the wife's right to a
loss of consortium claim was extremely slow to materitlize. The
Married Women's Acts were passed by many states beginning in
the 1840s in response to the re-evaluation of a woman's place in
society.3 3 These emancipation statutes eliminated many of the
procedural difficulties experienced by women bringing suits in their
own right and led to judicial decisions granting wives consortium
rights for intentional interferences with the marriage relationship.
3 4
No equivalent rights, however, were granted to wives in negligent-
interference cases.
385
19 A. 1045 (1890); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Coodenough, 55 N.J.L. 577, 28 A. 3
(1893). These procedural quirks posed special problems for a wife's loss of con-
sortium claim. See Holbrook, supra note 27, at 3.
3 2 See, e.g., Ballard v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 33 Wis. 2d 601,
613-14, 148 N.W.2d 65, 72 (1967). One student commentator has asserted that
loss of consortium claims now consist primarily of "the sentimental and emotional
elements" of marriage and should not be viewed as anachronistic in light of modem
tort law allowing recovery for emotional distress. Comment, supra note 28, at 874.
33 These state emancipation statutes, though variable in their specific provisions,
generally granted a wife: (1) separate ownership of her own property; (2) the
right to sue without joining her husband and the right to retain the proceeds from
suits as her own property, and (3) the capacity to be sued without forcing the
plaintiff to join her husband along with separate responsibility for her own torts.
See W. PnossER, supra note 5, at 861; Holbrook, supra note 27, at 4. For a collec-
tion of these state statutes, see 3 C. VmuNm, AmImucArx F.mmy LAws, §§ 167, 179,
180 (1935).
34 Thus, wives were permitted to bring suits for the torts of alienation of affec-
tions and criminal conversation. See, e.g., Eliason v. Draper, 25 Del. 1, 77 A. 572
(Super. Ct. New Castle County 1910) (alienation of affections); Turner v. Heavrin,
182 Ky. 65, 206 S.W. 23 (1918) (criminal conversation); Sims v. Sims, 79 N.J.L.
577, 76 A. 1063 (1910) (alienation of affections).
35 See, e.g., Cravens v. L. & N. R.R., 195 Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922);
Emerson v. Taylor, 133 Md. 192, 104 A. 538 (1918); Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co.,
93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915). See generally Holbrook, supra note 27, at
4-6. The reasoning generally provided in these cases for the distinction between
negligent and intentional interference with the marital relationship was as follows:
In cases of alienation of affection and criminal conversation, the husband is, in effect,
a joint wrongdoer with the tortfeasor. He therefore has no cause of action against
the defendant and cannot recover for the injury sustained. If the husband is negli-
gently injured, however, he may institute his own suit and recover for pain and
suffering and loss of earnings. Because the measurement of damages at trial is so
crude, the maintenance of a separate loss of consortium suit by a wife will likely
result in double recovery of damages in the negligent deprivation area, a risk not
present in the case of intentional interferences with the marital relationship in which
the husband is barred from suing. See Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic
Relations, 14 MICH. L. Bsv. 177, 194 (1916) ("[Ilf husband and wife were each
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This sexist vestige of the common law consortium doctrine was
successfully challenged in Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,36 which granted
a wife consortium rights in a case in which her husband was in-
jured by negligent conduct. Forty states and the District of Colum-
bia have followed suit and presently grant the wife consortium
rights for negligent interference with the marital relationship,
either by judicial decision 37 or by statute.38  Seven states have dis-
allowed to sue, instead of each recovering an exact reparation, each would be pretty
sure to recover what would repair the injury to both.").
80183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
37The following states have granted the wife standing to bring a loss of con-
sortium action through judicial action: Alabama: Swartz v. United States Steel Corp.,
293 Ala. 439, 304 So. 2d 881 (1974); Alaska: Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462
(Alaska Sup. Ct. 1974); Arizona: City of Glendale v. Bradshaw, 108 Ariz. 582, 503
P.2d 803 (1972); Arkansas: Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299
S.W.2d 41 (1957); California: Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382,
525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974); Delaware: Yonner v. Adams, 53 Del. 229,
167 A.2d 717 (Super. Ct. 1961); District of Columbia: Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,
183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950); Florida: Gates v.
Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Sup. Ct 1971); Georgia: Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee
Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953); Idaho: Nichols v. Sonneman,
91 Idaho 199, 418 P.2d 562 (1966) (wife's right to sue for loss of consortium
unchallenged by defense and assumed by the court); Illinois: Dini v. Naiditch, 20
Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Indiana: Troue v. Marker, 253 Ind. 284, 252
N.E.2d 800 (1969); Iowa: Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956);
Maryland: Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967); Massa-
chusetts: Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973); Michigan:
Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960); Minnesota: Thill
v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969); Missouri: Novak
v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1963); Nevada: General
Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972); New Jersey: Ekalo v. Con-
structive Serv. Corp. of Am., 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965); New York: Millington
v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305
(1968); North Carolina: Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., Inc., 300
N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980); North Dakota: Hastings v. James River Aerie
No. 2337-Fraternal Order of Eagles, 246 N.W.2d 747 (N.D. Sup. Ct 1976);
Ohio: Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc., 22 Ohio St. 2d 65, 258
N.E.2d 230 (1970); Pennsylvania: Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139
(1974) (equal protection grounds); South Dakota: Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 78 S.D.
82, 98 N.W.2d 669 (1959); Texas: Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Sup.
Ct. 1978); Vermont: Whitney v. Fisher, 417 A.2d 934 (Vt Sup. Ct. 1980); Wis-
consin: Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137
(1967) (wife must join injured husband's suit). In Montana and Nebraska, neither
state courts nor the legislatures have decided the issue; federal courts in both states,
however, have interpreted state law to permit wives to bring loss of consortium
actions. Guyton v. Solomon Dehydrating Co., 302 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1962)
(Nebraska law); Dutton v. Hightower & Lubrecht Constr. Co., 214 F. Supp. 298
(D. Mont. 1963) (Montana law).
3sThose states granting the wife standing to bring a loss of consortium action
by statute include: Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-209 (1973); Kentucky: Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. §411.145 (1970); Maine: ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 167-A
(Supp. 1980); Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-3-1 (1972); New Hampshire:
N.H. REv. STAT. Aw. § 507:8-a (1968); Oklahoma: OxIA. STAT. ANN. tit 32, § 15
(West 1976); Oregon: On. REv. STAT. § 108.010 (1979); South Carolina: S.C. CODEZ
§ 15-75-20 (1976); Tennessee: TEm. CODE ANN. § 25-109 (Supp. 1979); West
Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 48-3-19a (1980).
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allowed loss of consortium suits by wives,3 9 while three states appar-
ently have not resolved the issue.
40
B. Consortium Doctrine and Unmarried Partners
Although many aspects of consortium law have yielded to
change as the common law doctrine has evolved, one element has
remained constant: the restriction of loss of consortium claims to
partners in a legally recognized marital relationship. As noted by
the district court in Bulloch v. United States,4' nearly all previous
decisions have assumed without discussion that legal marriage is a
required element of proof in a loss of consortium action.4 Those
decisions that have specifically examined the marital status of the
plaintiff have typically involved a collateral attack on the validity
of an asserted marriage. Thus, the legal analysis has been limited to
whether a legal marital relationship (common law or otherwise)
existed under the particular facts of the case.43  Indeed, the assump-
tion of the necessity of a legally recognized marriage appears to have
been shared by the plaintiffs, as well as by the other parties to the
suit.
44
Bulloch is the first case to examine the question whether con-
sortium rights should be granted to unmarried cohabitants as an
incident of their particular cohabitational status. Notwithstand-
ing the novel setting in which Bulloch arose,45 profitable compari-
sons can be made with previous suits brought by persons who mar-
3 9 Those states disallowing the wife standing to bring a loss of consortium action
include: Connecticut: Lockwood v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 144 Conn. 155, 128 A.2d
330 (1956); Kansas: Hoffman v. Dautel, 192 Kan. 406, 388 P.2d 615 (1964);
Louisiana: Bourque v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 345 So. 2d 237 (La. Ct. App.
1977); New Mexico: Roseberry v. Starkovich, 73 N.M. 211, 387 P.2d 321 (1963);
Utah: Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d 143, 493 P.2d 985 (1972) (holding consortium
rights barred to both husband and wife on statutory grounds); Wyoming: Bates v.
Donnafield, 481 P.2d 347 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. 1971). VA. CODE § 55-36 (1950) abol-
ished the husband's right to bring a loss of consortium action for injury to his wife.
In Carey v. Foster, 345 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1965), the Fourth Circuit interpreted
this provision to bar similar actions brought by wives.
40Those states that apparently have not addressed this issue directly include:
Hawaii: Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970) (implies that wives
have consortium rights); Rhode Island: Mariani v. Nanni, 95 R.I. 153, 185 A.2d 119
(1962) (alludes to wives' consortium rights); Washington: no case law or statutes
located.
41487 F. Supp. 1078, 1079 (D.N.J. 1980).
42 See, e.g., Cooper v. Lish, 318 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Jones v. Beasley,
476 F. Supp. 116, 118 (M.D. Ga. 1979).
4 3 See, e.g., Domany v. Otis Elevator Co., 369 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1966);
De Vito v. Hoffman, 199 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
44 This might explain the relative paucity of loss of consortium suits instituted
by unmarried plaintiffs.
45 See text following note 12 supra.
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Tied after the relevant accident but before filing a loss of consor-
tium suit.
For example, in Rademacher v. Torbensen,46 a husband as-
serted a loss of consortium claim based on injuries incurred by his
wife two months before their marriage. In discussing the plain-
tiff's claim, the court in Rademacher stated:
[A]t the time of the alleged antenuptial tort suffered by
the woman plaintiff subsequently married, the plaintiff
sustained no injury. Under the allegations of his com-
plaint plaintiff possessed no marital right at that time; he
had then assumed no marital obligations. If, at the time
of his subsequent marriage, plaintiff's wife was disabled as
a result of a previous negligent act by the defendant, the
plaintiff took her as his wife in her then existing state of
health and thus assumed any deprivation resulting from
such disability.
47
The underlying premises of the Rademacher court are that con-
sortium rights stem directly from, and only from, the marriage rela-
tionship and that in knowingly choosing to marry a negligently
injured person, the spouse waives any right he or she has to recover
for harm to the marital relationship caused by a pre-marriage tort.
This line of reasoning has been echoed in several recent deci-
sions that have continued to restrict consortium rights to marital
partners. In Chiesa v. Rowe48 and Sawyer v. Bailey,49 loss of con-
sortium actions were brought by persons whose spouses were in-
jured during engagement but prior to marriage. In granting
dismissal of the plaintiff's claim, the court in Chiesa summarily
stated that a loss of consortium suit, by definition, exists only in
the presence of a legal marriage.50 Consortium rights were held
to be an incident of and solely derivative from the marital rela-
48 257 A.D. 91, 13 N.Y.S.2d 124 (1939).
47 Id. at 91, 13 N.Y.S.2d at 124. In Sartori v. Gradison Auto Bus Co., 42 Pa.
D. & C.2d 781 (1967), a Pennsylvania court denied a loss of consortium action to
a similarly situated plaintiff, reasoning that a subsequent husband "should not be
entitled to marry a cause of action. The tortfeasor . . . takes his victim as he finds
him. The victim should not acquire new parties as she proceeds along the roads of
romance." Id. 785. Two subsequent cases relied on the Sartori ruling in reaching
conflicting conclusions. See Sutherland v. Auch Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366 F.
Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (short time interval between the relevant accident and
marriage required modification of Sartori and the granting of consortium rights);
Wagner v. International Harvester Co., 455 F. Supp. 168 (D. Minn. 1978) (relied
,on Sartori and denied consortium rights to subsequent wife).
48486 F. Supp. 236 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
49413 A.2d 165 (Me. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1980).
50 486 F. Supp. at 238.
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tionship.51 The court also relied on the concept of waiver: by
marrying a previously injured person, one "waives her rights to
another level or form of conjugal fellowship which might have
been obtained had she married another." 52
The Sawyer opinion discussed the legal issues involved more
extensively. The state court first recognized that the plaintiff pos-
sessed an inchoate expectation that the tortfeasor would use due
care in relation to his fiancee, so that his prospective marital rights
would not be harmed.53 Despite this acknowledged legal duty,
however, countervailing policy considerations mandated the con-
finement of consortium rights to marital partners. Although the
actual harm might be incurred by the plaintiff, legal causation
requires recoveries for loss of consortium to be restricted to the
marital relationship in order to prevent the inordinate expansion
of tort liability for loss of consortium claims 4 The court in
Sawyer then delegated the responsibility for establishing nonmarital
consortium rights to the legislature.55
In extending consortium rights to unmarried cohabitants, the
Bulloch court's holding appears to be in conflict with the law of
other jurisdictions. As noted above, most courts have summarily
held that consortium rights flow solely and specifically from a legal
marital relationship. These decisions imply that no injury to a
consortium interest can be sustained by an unmarried person be-
cause such interests are, by definition, peculiar to a marital rela-
tionship.
To some extent, however, the reasoning of such decisions rep-
resents no more than an automatic adherence to the common law
definition of consortium interest with its roots in the husband's
marital right to his wife's services. 56 The validity of this doctrinal
perspective, however, has been eroded over time by modern, more
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 413 A.2d at 167.
54 Id. 168.
55 Id. In Tong v. Joeson, 76 Cal. App. 3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1977),
the California Court of Appeals dealt with a factual situation even more similar to
Bulloch. The plaintiff's partner sustained injuries during their engagement while
the couple was cohabiting. The couple was married within one month of the acci-
dent. The Tong court denied consortium rights to the plaintiff, following reasoning
similar to that employed by the court in Sawyer. Unlike the Bulloch opinion, the
legal analysis of the Tong court did not center on the unmarried cohabitation ar-
rangement and the legal rights that could derive from that relationship. Rather,
the court merely adopted the traditional definition of consortium as only incident to
the marital relationship.
56 See notes 26-31 supra & accompanying text.
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egalitarian views of marriage.5 7 Although the services-based view
of the consortium interest has not been completely abandoned, the
modem doctrine now emphasizes the intangible sentimental aspects
of the spousal relationship.
Because the essence of a modern loss of consortium action is
the harm suffered by one spouse as the result of a close emotional
involvement with an injured mate, denial of consortium rights to
unmarried cohabitants in stable and intimate relationships cannot
be justified on merely definitional grounds. The critical defect,
therefore, of both Sawyer and Chiesa, and other similar decisions,
is the courts' refusal to acknowledge that the relational interest
protected by the modem consortium doctrine is not confined to
marital relationships. The loss of companionship, emotional sup-
port, love, and affection caused by injury to an unmarried mate
cannot be negated simply because of the lack of a state-sanctioned
marital ceremony; the basis of the modern consortium interest is
derived from the emotional commitment of the individuals, not
from a marriage ceremony. Thus, changing social and legal atti-
tudes towards the relative roles of husband and wife have broadened
the basis of the modem consortium interest; as that interest has
broadened, the definitional approach of courts denying loss of con-
sortium actions to unmarried plaintiffs has had decreasing validity.
Because both married and unmarried cohabitants can theo-
retically suffer identical damage to their relational interests, it
would appear, as an initial matter, that both should be entitled to
legal protection of their consortium interests. This Comment next
explores the changing judicial attitudes toward marriage and un-
married cohabitation to determine whether policy reasons exist to
justify extending or withholding standing to maintain loss of con-
sortium suits to unmarried cohabitants. This general policy dis-
cussion is followed by an examination of how traditional principles
of tort law would apply to an unmarried deprived cohabitant's
action for loss of consortium.
II. LEGAL ATrTuUDEs TowARD MARRIAGE AND
UNMARRIED COHABITATION
Although this Comment subsequently demonstrates that the
application of traditional tort principles supports the granting of a
loss of consortium action to unmarried cohabitants, the decision
whether to afford legal protection to the consortium interests of
57' See note 32 supra & accompanying text
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unmarried cohabitants rests, ultimately, on social policy considera-
tions."" More specifically, the denial of a cause of action to un-
married cohabitants can be justified only by the state's attitude to-
wards the institution of marriage itself. The distinction drawn
between marital and nonmarital consortium rights is valid only if
one can isolate underlying values that are protected and promoted
solely within the legal marital relationship. An examination of
these intimate relationships, as defined by constitutional and state
law, reveals that the absolute denial of consortium rights to un-
married cohabitants is not defensible on social policy grounds be-
cause nonmarital unions frequently contain the essential attributes
of marital relationships-those attributes isolated by the courts and
deemed worthy of protection.
A. The Supreme Court, Marriage, and the Family
The Supreme Court has long considered the right to marry to
be "one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men." 5 9 Although the Court has frequently
noted the importance of this individual right,60 the unequivocal
elevation of the right to marry to a constitutionally protected
plane I" did not occur until the Court decided Zablocki v. Redhail 62
in 1978. The Redhail Court struck down a state statute that placed
severe restrictions on the right of a certain class of persons to
marry 63 by holding that the right to marry was fundamental and
5 8 In an analogous situation, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
In the ultimate, the acceptance or rejection of the wife's consortium claim
must be rested on sound policy considerations and a proper balancing of
the interests concerned. While engaging in their activities, the defendants
clearly came under the comprehensive common law duty of due care with
tort liability for its breach. ... [Tihere being no sufficient countervailing
policy, the law now rightly views them as remediable by the responsible
tortfeasors.
Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of Am., 46 N.J. 82, 95, 215 A.2d 1, 8 (1965).
59 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
60 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965):
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring,
and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that pro-
motes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths;
a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association
for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
61In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), the Court stated in
dictum that the substantive right of "liberty" protected by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment included the right of an individual to "marry, establish
a home and bring up children" as a fundamental privilege of personal freedom.
62434 U.S. 374 (1978).
63 The Court in Redhail dealt with a state statute that conditioned the right of
certain individuals to marry on a showing of compliance with child support obliga-
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that any direct and substantial infringements of that right must be
subjected to rigorous judicial scrutiny."
Although the Court in Redhail extended special constitutional
protection to the marital relationship, the Supreme Court has, thus
far, limited this special protection of associational rights to the
context of the traditional marital relationship. 5 One of the rea-
sons for this limitation is the Court's perception of the role of
marriage-apart from its importance to individuals-as one of the
fundamental cornerstones of American society. As early as 1888,
the Court described marriage as "creating the most important re-
lation in life, having more to do with the morals and civilization
of a people than any other institution." 66 More specifically, spe-
cial treatment of marriage is viewed as appropriate by the Court
because of that relationship's role as the structural core of the
American family.6T Thus, this Comment argues, the Court's pro-
tective attitude towards marriage is based not on any "moral" view
about unmarried cohabitation, but rather on a judgment that mar-
riage is the paradigmatic building block for the American nuclear
tions and a demonstration that any of one's minor children not in one's custody were
not presently and were not likely to become public charges.
64 Id. 386-88. The court in Redhail noted specifically that many forms of state
regulation of marriage were permissible, despite the fundamental nature of the right
to marry:
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do
not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way
to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to
rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not sig-
nificantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may
legitimately be imposed.
Id. 386. This reasoning is consistent with an earlier decision, Califano v. Jobst, 434
U.S. 47 (1977), in which the Court upheld a Social Security Act provision that
reduced benefits granted to a certain class of persons after marriage. Because the
statutes interference with the marital relationship was not significant, low-level
judicial scrutiny was justified and the provision survived attack.
65 Thus, the Court has refused to extend the constitutional right to marry to
homosexual couples. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (dismissal of an appeal
from the denial of a marriage license to a homosexual couple).
G6 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (considering the validity of a
state legislative enactment granting a divorce).
67 Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 843 (1977). See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. at 211 ("[Marriage] is an insti-
tution, in the maintenance of which . . . the public is deeply interested, for it is
the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither
,civilization nor progress."). Several other decisions, by citing cases dealing with
the family, have implied that marriage is a fundamental right because of its familial
role. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. at 384-85; Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. at 12; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 482. See generally Developments
in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 Hnv. L. BInv. 1156, 1270-77
(1980) thereinafter cited as Family Developments].
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family 08 and, therefore, that it is the family as an institution that
the Court is seeking to protect.
This interpretation of the Supreme Court's view of marriage
takes on added meaning because of the Court's willingness to rec-
ognize that many familial attributes can be present in nontradi-
tional family arrangements. 9 Recent opinions of the Court have
helped expose some of the Court's thinking with respect to what
types of personal relationships possess the characteristics that war-
rant extending to them the constitutional protection that previously
had been accorded only to the traditional nuclear family. In three
of those opinions-Moore v. City of East Cleveland,70 United States
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,71 and Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas,72-the Court appeared to limit its strict scrutiny (symp-
68 The traditional nuclear family consists of two adults who consensually form
a heterosexual union under formal legal sanction and raise children within this
relationship. See Zelditch & Morris, Family, Marriage and Kinship, in HANDBOo0
oF MoDusN SocIoLoGY 697 (B. Fain's ed. 1964).
69 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("Nor has the law refused
to recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage.").
70 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
Moore was the first Supreme Court decision to grant an extended family special
constitutional protection. The Court in Moore invalidated a city housing ordinance
that limited dwelling occupancy to members of a single "family," where "family'"
had been defined as encompassing only certain blood and familial relations. In
recognizing that the constitutional rights of the "family" inhered in a household of
a grandmother and two grandsons who were cousins, the Court was guided by
American tradition, history, and the societal values that underlie the sanctity of the
family unit. The plurality explained that "[ojurs is by no means a tradition limited
to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition
of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along
with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of
constitutional recognition." Id. 504.
The plurality in Moore also pointed out that childrearing duties and other tra-
ditional household responsibilities necessary for the maintenance of a secure home
life are often delegated to an extended family unit in times of family death or
economic need. Id. 505. The Court further noted that the Constitution prevents
the standardization of personal lifestyles "by forcing all to live in certain narrowly
defined family patterns" I& 506. Thus, the Moore decision is a clear manifestation
of the Supreme Court's willingness to extend certain "family" rights to domestic
arrangements that embrace personal commitments, family responsibilities, and emo-
tional ties similar to those present in the nuclear family unit
71413 U.S. 528 (1973).
In Moreno, the Supreme Court struck down a provision denying food stamp
assistance to households of unrelated individuals. The Court, however, did not base
its decision on any fundamental associational right in the particular household rela-
tionship at issue in the case. The Court stated that the purpose of the unrelated
person provision was to prevent "hippie communes" from participating in the food
stamp program and held that such a purpose could not salvage the law. This
holding was not based on an associational right but rather on the notion that equal
protection "must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest"
I& 534 (emphasis in original).
72 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
In Belle Terre, the Court upheld a village zoning ordinance that restricted
residence occupancy to households of no more than two unrelated persons. The
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tomatic of special constitutional protection) to blood relatives or
legally sanctioned relationships. In none of those decisions, how;-
ever, did the Court make any attempt to articulate precisely the
essential elements in a relationship that ultimately determine
whether a "family" entitled to special protection exists.73
In another recent opinion, Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality and Reform 74 (OFFER), the Supreme Court
finally turned to this task. OFFER upheld the constitutionality
of a state law that provided procedures for the removal of foster
children from foster homes. Although resting its decision on other
grounds, the Court in OFFER explored the possibility of a con-
stitutionally protected right to "family" privacy and integrity in
the foster family unit. The Court first stated that the concept of
the "family" usually implies a biological relationship, as between a
parent and child.76 Justice Brennan then noted in dictum that
[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the in-
dividuals involved and to the society, stems from the
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of
daily association, and from the role it plays in 'promot[ing]
a way of life' through the instruction of children, ... as
well as from the fact of blood relationship.7 6
The OFFER Court's analysis is crucial because of the opin-
ion's recognition that the importance of the family, from both a
personal and societal perspective, stems from the emotional and
psychological support and companionship 77 that it provides for
ordinance had been challenged by six college students who were unrelated by
blood, marriage, or adoption. The Court clearly stated that no fundamental family
interest was involved in such communal living arrangements. Id. 7. But the
Court specifically mentioned that the ordinance in question did not prohibit un-
married couples from living together. Id. 8.
73 In Family Developments, supra note 67, at 1280-81, the authors suggest five
attributes that, in some combination, constitute the essence of a constitutionally
protected family relationship: (1) biological relationship; (2) potential parent-child
relationship; (3) cohabitation; (4) permanence and formal commitment, and (5)
psychological support and involvement.
74 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
75 Id. 843.
76 Id. 844 (citation omitted). OFFER also cited a final consideration peculiar
to foster families, the origin of the family relationship in state contractual arrange-
ments. This final consideration persuaded the Court that no 'liberty interest" in-
hered in the foster family unit. Id. 845-46. See Kyees v. County Dep't of Pub.
Welfare of Tippecanoe County, 600 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1979); Drummond v.
Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977).
77 Note the similarity between those valuable "family" attributes recognized by
the Court in OFFER and the interests protected by the modem consortium doc-
trine. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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each family member.78 The OFFER decision implies that the
essence of the family stems not from any legally structured family
unit, but from the stability and intimacy of an established home
environment. 79
Taken as a group, these four Supreme Court cases demonstrate
that the Court, though guided by historical and traditional defini-
tions of the American family, 0 has also looked to the values pro-
tected by and cultivated within various domestic arrangements in
developing a modern definition of the family."' In viewing the
family unit functionally S2-as a transmitter of culture, a stable pro-
vider of emotional commitment and financial support, an educator
of children, and a setting for procreative activity-one realizes that
the essence of the family can be found outside of the narrow con-
fines of the traditional family relationship. Similarly, if marriage
gains its sanctity as the genesis of family life,8 any intimate domestic
78 Two subsequent Supreme Court opinions have followed the OFFER Court's
lead and examined extensively the quality of nontraditional family arrangements as
an integral step in the adjudication of conflicting constitutional rights.
In Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), the Court upheld a Georgia
statute allowing a natural mother and stepfather to adopt a child without the
consent of the child's natural, unwed father. The Court noted that the natural
father had never shouldered any responsibility for the daily supervision, education,
protection, or care of his children and, therefore, was not entitled to the paternal
rights traditionally associated with his blood relationship. Id. 256. But Quiloin
was distinguished in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), during the fol-
lowing term. In Caban, the Court sustained a similar New York statute. Although
the holding was based on equal protection grounds, the Court noted expressly that
the father in Caban had a "significant paternal interest in the child." Id. 394.
Thus, even in the case of unmarried cohabitation arrangements, the Court ap-
parently views the quality of the familial relationship to be the determinative
consideration. Quilloin and Caban together imply that blood relationships, a
traditionally "formal" consideration, must give way to more functional analyses of
the dynamics of individual family relationships.
79 One commentator has noted that "the most significant function of marriage
today seems to be that it furnishes emotional satisfaction to be found in no other
relationships." Clark, The New Marriage, 12 W.xa-mr_= L.J. 441, 443 (1976).
This statement is consistent with the view that marriage is socially beneficial because
of its role as the structural origin of the American family.
8 0 See, e.g., note 70 supra.
81 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 508 (Brennan, J., con-
curring):
In today's America, the "nuclear family" is the pattern so often found
in much of white suburbia. . . . The Constitution cannot be interpreted,
however, to tolerate the imposition by government upon the rest of us
white suburbias preference in patterns of family living. The "extended
family" . . . remains not merely still a pervasive living pattern, but under
the goad of brutal economic necessity, a prominent pattern-virtually a
means of survival-for large numbers of the poor and deprived minorities
of our society.
See also note 1 supra.
82 See text accompanying note 76 supra.
8 3 See text accompanying notes 65-68 supra.
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relationship-such as unmarried cohabitation-that promotes and
protects these essential familial attributes should receive the same
judicial protection and respect.
8 4
Application of this functional approach to consortium law
argues for the recognition of nonmarital consortium rights.85 The
rigid limitation of consortium rights to married partners highlights
the courts' failure to examine the characteristics of individual non-
8 4 One general manifestation of the judicial protection granted by the Supreme
Court to individuals in familial matters is the Court's description of the scope of
the constitutional right to privacy. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972),
the Court recognized a constitutional right to privacy that protects individuals from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into any intimate associations or relationships
into which they choose to enter. In striking down a state statute outlawing the
dispensation of contraceptives to unmarried persons, the Court in Eisenstadt relied
on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which had recognized a con-
stitutional right to privacy inhering in the marital relationship. As the Eisenstadt
Court stated:
[Tihe marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart
of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means any-
thing, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affect-
ing a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original). Thus, Eisenstadt effectively transformed
Grswold's right to marital privacy into a more generalized right to privacy in
intimate matters. See generally Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89
YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
In addition, the individual's right to privacy in the choice of nontraditional
lifestyles has been protected by several lower federal courts dealing with cases
involving denial of or dismissal from employment owing to one's sexual conduct.
See Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School Dist, 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir.
1975) (denial of employment to unwed parents violates due process and equal
protection clauses); Drake v. Covington County Bd. of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974
(M.D. Ala. 1974) (immorality provision of state code held to be applied in manner
that violated plaintiff's right to privacy); Mindel v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (termination of postal clerk's employ-
ment because of private sex life violates right to privacy). The Supreme Court,
however, failed to extend a similar protection to an unmarried cohabiting couple
who had been discharged from their state jobs because of their openly acknowledged
sexual behavior in Hollengaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978)
(denial of certiorari). Justice Marshall argued in dissent that "[p]etitioners' right
to pursue an open rather than a clandestine personal relationship to rear their child
together in this environment closely resemble the other aspects of personal privacy
to which we have extended constitutional protection. That petitioners' arrangement
was unconventional or socially disapproved does not negate the resemblance...
Id. 1055 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85 At times, Congress also has tended to view unmarried cohabitation arrange-
ments in a functional manner. The Supplemental Security Income program pro-
vides one such example. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1976 & Supp. I1 1979).
The statutory scheme for determining SSI eligibility "deems" the income and
resources of the applicant-spouse to include the income and resources of his or her
spouse "living with him [or her] in the same household." Id. § 1382c(f) (1)
(1976). Apparently in recognition of the functional equivalence of unmarried
cohabitation and marriage, partners 'olding themselves out to the community in
which they reside as husband and wife" are expressly deemed to be spouses for
the purposes of the SSI program. Id. § 1382c(d)(2).
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marital unions and to protect those intimate relationships that are
the functional equivalent of marriage. Consonant with the Su-
preme Court's approach, consortium rights should be granted to
any nonmarital union that embraces and cultivates the essential
attributes of the traditional family unit.
B. The State Courts and Unmarried Cohabitation
The Supreme Court's recent willingness to view nontraditional
family units in functional terms has been echoed in state court
regulation of these relationships. In dealing with unmarried co-
habitation, several states have exhibited a drastic shift in approach
as a result of changing moral standards and increasing recognition
that these relationships often display the essential attributes of mar-
riage and traditional family life.86 Like the Supreme Court's more
expansive view of familial interests entitled to special protection,
state courts' increasing acceptance of unmarried cohabitation ar-
rangements argues for the extension of a loss of consortium action
to unmarried cohabitants.
1. Property Rights
Recent state court decisions have displayed a growing recogni-
tion of property rights emanating from the structure of the non-
marital union.87 For many years, separating unmarried partners
with disputes over economic matters were rebuffed by the courts
that they petitioned to aid in the resolution of their disagreements. 88
Dismissing nonmarital cohabitation as "meretricious," 89 many
courts traditionally have refused to enforce contracts between un-
86 Several states have repealed criminal penalties for sexual acts in private be-
tween consenting, unmarried adults. See, e.g., OR. R v. STAT. § 167.010 (Supp.
1969) (repealed 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4505 (Purdon Supp. 1971) (re-
pealed 1972). State courts have also begun to develop new theories that recognize
certain legal rights based on agreements between the partners in a nonmarital
union. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr.
815 (1976); In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972);
Note, Beyond Marvin: A Proposal for Quasi-Spousal Support, 30 STAN. L. uv.
359, 373 (1978).
8T See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1976); In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973);
Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1977); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski,
80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979); Note, Property Rights of Nonmarital Partners
in Meretricious Cohabitation, 13 Nmv ENGLAND L. Rllv. 453 (1978).
8 8 See, e.g., Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593
(1962); Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1943);
Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
89 See Hinkle v. McColm, 89 Wash. 2d 769, 575 P.2d 711 (1978). Classifica-
tion of all unmarried cohabitation as immoral or meretricious is exceedingly unjust
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married partners on the grounds that such contracts were based on
immoral and illicit consideration. 0
Marvin v. Marvin,91 a landmark decision of the California
Supreme Court, marked a shift in the legal recognition of the prop-
erty rights of unmarried cohabitants. The Marvin court stated
that nonmarital unions were not immoral per se and that the denial
of judicial relief on moral grounds could not be defended:
[W]e believe that the prevalence of nonmarital relation-
ships in modern society and the social acceptance of them,
marks this as a time when our courts should by no means
apply the doctrine of the unlawfulness of the so-called
meretricious relationship . . . . [T]he nonenforceability
of agreements expressly providing for meretricious conduct
rested on the fact that such conduct, as the word suggests,
pertained to and encompassed prostitution. To equate the
nonmarital relationship of today to such a subject matter
is to do violence to an accepted and wholly different
practice.
92
The court in Marvin then held that courts should enforce not only
express contracts between nonmarital partners, but also should
employ the doctrines of implied contract, quantum meruit, and
other equitable remedies to achieve a fair distribution of cohabita-
tional property.
93
Many recent state court decisions have followed Marvin's lead,
and the analogous lead of the Supreme Court, and have taken a prag-
in light of the facts underlying many of these decisions. See, e.g., Stevens v.
Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 256 P.2d 712 (1953) (30 years of cohabitation); Hewitt
v. Hewitt, 77 I1. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979) (15 years of cohabitation during
iwhich three children were born and raised).
9 0 E.g., Stevens v. Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 335, 256 P.2d 712, 715 (1953).
The frequently unjust results of such judicial reasoning are illustrated in Rehak v.
Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977). The couple involved in Rehah had
cohabited for 18 years. Although the woman paid more than hal the purchase
price of their home and consistently rendered household services, the state court
refused to grant her any compensation for her services or her interest in the property
because, in the court's view, any contract between the parties was founded on
immoral consideration. One commentator has noted, however, that state courts have
often avoided such inequitable results through the use of judicial devices-including
notions of common law marriage, marriage by estoppel, conclusive presumption, or
prescription, and putative marriage-granting "marital status" to informal, de facto
marriages. Weyrauch, Informal and Formal Marriage-An Appraisal of Trends in
Family Organization, 28 U. CH. L. REv. 88, 104-08 (1960). For an example of the
lengths to which courts have gone in devising a legal remedy to effect an equitable
result, see McCullon v. McCullon, 96 Misc. 2d 962, 410 N.Y.S.2d 226 (Sup. Ct.
1978) (common law marriage found in case in which cohabiting couple held
themselves out as man and wife during annual vacations to a state recognizing this
legal relationship).
91 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
92 Id. at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
93 Id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32.
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matic approach to nonmarital unions. These cases have looked to
the outward appearance of an unconventional family relationship
and actual investments of the parties involved, and have granted
relief to partners in relationships that are the functional equivalent
of the marital union.94 Many of these decisions are ostensibly based
on the express or implied agreements of the unmarried partners.-
But it is unclear that the intention of unmarried partners can al-
ways be so clearly discerned.96 In any case, the extension of many
marital rights to nonmarital relationships implies a judicial acknowl-
edgment that unmarried cohabitation, in some cases, may encom-
pass all of the essential attributes of a legally sanctioned marital
union.97
2. Workmen's Compensation
Workmen's compensation law is also beginning to recognize
that legal rights may stem from unmarried relationships. Work-
men's compensation programs have been set up to provide benefits
94 See, e.g., Tyranski v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.W.2d 595 (1973);
Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1977); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski,
80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979); Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 577 P.2d 507 (1978);
McHenry v. Smith, 45 Or. App. 813, 609 P.2d 855 (1980). But see Rehak v.
Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394
N.E.2d 1204 (1979); Hinkle v. McColm, 89 Wash. 2d 769, 575 P.2d 711 (1978).
95 See Tyranski v. Figgins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.W.2d 595 (1973) (ex-
press contract); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979) (express
contract to provide lifelong support for cohabiting spouse); McHenry v. Smith, 45
Or. App. 813, 609 P.2d 855 (1980) (oral contract to pool resources and to establish
a home and live together as husband and wife); Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 577
P.2d 507 (1978) (implied contract to pool resources); Latham v. Latham, 247
Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976) (express contract). But see Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77
Ill. 2d 49, 61, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (1979) ("In our view .. . the situation
alleged here was not the kind of arm's length bargain envisioned by traditional
contract principles, but an intimate arrangement of a fundamentally different
kind.").
" See Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 407 N.E.2d 438, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592
(1980) (refusal to find implied contract with respect to assets and earnings because
the agreement was "so amorphous as practically to defy equitable enforcement").
97In Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 III. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979), the court openly
discussed the legal issues involved in determining property rights of unmarried
cohabitants:
[T]he situation alleged here was not the kind of arm's length bargain envi-
sioned by traditional contract principles, but an intimate arrangement of a
fundamentally different kind. The issue, realistically, is whether it is appro-
priate for this Court to grant a legal status to a private arrangement substi-
tuting for the institution of marriage sanctioned by the State.
Id. at 61, 394 N.E.2d at 1209. The court in Hewitt held that this policy decision
should be addressed by the legislature. The court also expressed concern that im-
position of the legal incidents of marriage on nonmarital relationships would, in
practical effect, constitute a revival of the doctrine of common law marriage. In a
similar vein, one commentator has expressed a concern that the present trend in the
law will lead to uncertainty in predicting the legal consequences of a nonmarital
living arrangement. Clark, supra note 79, at 451.
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to dependents for loss of income owing to work-related injuries,
regardless of fault.98  The statutes traditionally have been inter-
preted to exclude unmarried partners from the category of "de-
pendents" who are eligible for statutory benefits.99 This interpre-
tation generally has been based on traditional views of domestic
relationships-similar to those noted in connection with property
rights for unmarried cohabitants-that have condemned nonmari-
tal unions as immoral.10°
In recent years, however, several jurisdictions have extended
benefits to dependent partners in nonmarital relationships.101 These
decisions have reasoned that the objective of workmen's compensa-
tion programs-providing financial support to dependents of in-
jured workmen-is unrelated to the marital status of the dependents
or to any moral judgments based on that status.'1° To be sure,
unmarried partners are not eligible to receive workmen's com-
pensation benefits in all states.10u But courts that deny benefits to
such claimants tend to do so on narrow, statutory-based grounds; 104
the moral content of the older decisions is conspicuously absent.105
And in states in which the statute is permissive, courts tend to view
the unmarried relationship functionally and make their determina-
tions based on the equivalent dependent status of married and
unmarried partners.1w
3. State Interest Favoring Marriage
These state decisions are indicative of the judiciary's increasing
willingness to look beyond legal marital status, to the circumstances
98See W. ScHNEmmiD, ScmmR's Wonmrmrs ComPENsATION § 3 (3d ed.
1941).
9 9 See, e.g., Powell v. Rogers, 496 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1974); W. ScmxmmH,
supra note 98, at § 1910.
100 See generally A. BARBiEBI, IPqS msLvAm WonmN's ComPENSATiON AD
OCCuPATIONAL DsEAsE §§ 5.34(1)(b), 5.34(2) (1975).
101 See, e.g., Burgess Constr. Co. v. Lindley, 504 P.2d 1023 (Alaska Sup. Ct.
1972); Russell v. Johnson, 220 Ind. 649, 46 N.E.2d 219 (1943); Kendall v. Housing
Auth., 196 Md. 370, 76 A.2d 767 (1950); West v. Barton-Malow Co., 394 Mich.
334, 230 N.W.2d 545 (1975); Parkinson v. I & S Tool Co., 64 NJ. 159, 313 A.2d
609 (1974). See also OR. REy. STAT. § 656.226 (1979).
102 E.g., West v. Barton-Malow Co., 394 Mich. 334, 338-41, 230 N.W.2d 545,
547-48 (1975).
1
0 3 A. LAnSON, TbE LAw or Wonxmmes CoMTEusAroN § 63A3 (1980 &
Supp.).
10 4 E.g., Powell v. Rogers, 496 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1032 (1975); Lavoie v. International Paper Co., 403 A.2d 1186 (Me. Sup. Jud.
Ct. 1979).
105 E.g., West v. Barton-Malow Co., 394 Mich. 334, 230 N.W.2d 545 (1975).
106 E.g., Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 1031 (La. Sup. Ct. 1978),
reveg 346 So. 2d 816 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Kendall v. Housing Auth., 196 Md. 370,
76 A.2d 767 (1950).
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and characteristics of particular intimate arrangements, in deter-
ming the legal rights and responsibilities involved in a cohabita-
tional relationship. The states still, however, have some interest
in the institution of marriage. 10 7 This state interest in marriage
might be asserted as a ground for denying legal protection to the
consortium interest of unmarried cohabitants. Yet, as Judge
Ackerman noted in his opinion in Bulloch v. United States, grant-
ing a loss of consortium action to an unmarried deprived cohabitant
"does not mean that the marital relationship is devalued." 108 As
Judge Ackerman pointed out, it is highly unlikely that the restric-
tion of legally protected consortium rights to married persons will
encourage unmarried cohabitants to marry so that they might be
able to maintain a loss of consortium action should one of them be
tortiously injured.10 9 Instead, the denial of a loss of consortium
action for unmarried cohabitants will serve only to deprive poten-
tial plaintiffs of any chance of compensation for genuine injuries
suffered. The only beneficiaries of such a policy, the Bulloch court
suggested, would be tortfeasors who are fortunate enough to injure
an unmarried, rather than a married, cohabitant.110
107 States have asserted such interests in marriage as the need to collect vital
statistics and the need to enforce public health measures concerning venereal or
contagious diseases that might affect spouses or children. See H. CLAuK, TnE LAw
oF DolmmSnc RELAToNs iN TmE UNa= STATES 36 (1968). Regulation of marital
status has also been justified by the state interest in prohibiting such status to persons
of a certain age or mental capacity who are generally deemed incapable of handling
the responsibilities of the marriage relationship. See Family Developments, supra
note 67, at 1257-70; Comment, A Constitutional Analysis of Pennsylvania's Restric-
tions Upon Marriage, 81 DicK. L. REV. 71 (1978). See generally Glendon, Marriage
and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REv. 663 (1976).
108 487 F. Supp. 1078, 1085-86 (D.N.J. 1980).
I do not believe . . . that the New Jersey courts would interpose this
policy favoring marriage between a cohabitant and a tortfeasor. There
simply seems to be no reason to allow a tortfeasor to benefit from the policy
favoring marriage and, in the ultimate analysis, only tortfeasors would
benefit from such a holding.
... Recognizing an action for loss of consortium . . . [for unmarried
cohabitants] only means that tortfeasors will compensate more fully for the
actual damage caused. It does not mean that the marital relationship is
devalued. While many considerations may lead to marriage, I doubt many
decide to marry because they want to have a cause of action for loss of
consortium. Deciding against a cause of action for cohabitants, therefore,
is unlikely to encourage people to wed. Realistically, both married couples
and cohabitants dread the possibility of injury to their mate and suffer
when that injury occurs. It is the suffering of the mate of the physically
injured plaintiff that the tort compensates....
Id. (citation omitted).
109 Id,
11o Id.
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In view of the strong probability that denial of a loss of con-
sortium action for unmarried cohabitants will not promote the state
interest in marriage, and in light of the changing attitude of the
judiciary towards unmarried cohabitation in other areas of the
law, it is submitted that state policies favor the extension of legal
protection to the consortium interests of unmarried cohabitants.
This Comment next considers whether traditional tort principles
present any obstacles to such an extension.
III. APPLICATION OF TRADITIONAL TORT PRINCIPLES
Application of traditional tort principles to loss of consortium
claims reveals the inequities that inhere in limiting such damage
awards to legally married partners."' Moreover, tort-based analysis
discloses another fundamental problem of the majority view of loss
of consortium actions; the simplistic use of marital status as a stand-
ing screen is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive in effect.
Changing cohabitational practices mandate the adoption of a judi-
cial standard that is more capable of identifying actual loss of con-
sortium suffered by partners in intimate personal relationships,
both inside and outside of marriage.
Several tort-based arguments might be raised against the grant-
ing of consortium rights to unmarried cohabitants. These include
the risk of affording plaintiffs a double recovery, the remoteness
of (or lack of proximate cause for) the deprived cohabitant's injury,
lack of foreseeability, the danger of inordinate expansion of liability
of tortfeasors, and the speculative nature of the deprived cohab-
itant's injury. 12 Of these, the risk of double recovery " 3 and the
"II See Comment, Loss of Consortium and Unmarried Cohabitors: An Examina-
tion of Tong v. Joeson, 14 U.S.F. L. Buy. 133, 146-50 (1979).
112 1t should be noted that actions for loss of consortium are generally con-
sidered to be derivative. See TORTS REsTATENMENT, supra note 3, at § 693, Comment
e; id. § 696, Comment a. Although it need not always be the case, this Comment
assumes that all loss of consortium actions discussed herein are cases in which the
deprived plaintiffs case is either joined with, or follows, the impaired plaintiff's own
cause of action. Thus, the deprived-cohabitant plaintiff need not prove the various
elements of an ordinary tort claim-existence of a duty, breach of that duty, proxi-
mate cause, etc.-as they will be proved in the impaired cohabitant's case. Like-
wise, any defense that the tortfeasor has against the impaired partner, such as
assumption of risk or contributory negligence, is also good against the deprived
partner. See id. § 693, Comment e; W. Pnossxn, supra note 5, at 892. But see
Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App. 3d 152, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1979) (refusing to
impute husband's contributory negligence to wife as a matter of statutory construc-
tion). Throughout the remainder of this Comment, whenever examples are used
it will be further assumed that the impaired cohabitant has a valid claim, subject to
no defenses, against the defendant.
13 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 404-07, 525
P.2d 669, 683-86, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 779-82 (1974).
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remoteness of the deprived cohabitant's injury 1 14 have been ade-
quately discussed by courts in the context of providing a loss of
consortium action to deprived spouses; no new considerations are
present when unmarried cohabitants are involved. The latter three
potential arguments do, however, present additional problems in
the context of unmarried cohabitants, and are therefore discussed
below.
A. Foreseeability
The potential argument that extending consortium rights to
unmarried cohabitants conflicts with the traditional tort policy con-
fining liability to injuries that were reasonably foreseeable at the
time of the accident 115 is not a valid reason for distinguishing be-
tween the consortium rights of married and unmarried partners.
Realistically, injury to consortium interests cannot be consistently
predicted or foreseen because tortfeasors are generally not aware of
the personal relationships in which their victims are involved. Yet
courts have already determined that lack of foreseeability is not
problematic; case law concerning married partners supports the legal
judgment that it is reasonably foreseeable that negligent conduct
towards an individual will have legally recognized effects on the
consortium rights of third parties."" The extension of consortium
rights to unmarried cohabitants is consistent with this view of the
foreseeability issue. If injury to a married partner is deemed suf-
ficiently foreseeable to justify imposing liability on tortfeasors,
then, by definition, injury to both married and unmarried partners
-whose numbers are obviously greater than the number of married
victims alone 1 7-is sufficiently foreseeable to justify holding tort-
114 See, e.g., id. at 399-401, 525 P.2d at 679-81, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 775-77.
115 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
See generally W. PNossmi, supra note 5, at 250-70.
116 See, e.g., Durham v. Gabriel, 16 Ohio App. 2d 51, 53, 241 N.E.2d 401, 402
(1968) (quoting 39 OsIo JuR. 2d Negligence § 31, at 535, 536) ("Since all victims
of tortious acts are not married, can loss of consortium be a forseeable consequence?
'It is sufficient that ... [the tortfeasor's] act, in light of all the surrounding circum-
stances, was likely to result in injury to someone."'). On the issue of foreseeability,
an instructive analogy can also be drawn to the recent decisions allowing recovery
for emotional distress caused by the mere witnessing of the negligent injury of a
family member. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72 (1968); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973);
Dave Snelling Lincoln-Mercury v. Simon, 508 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
But see Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980).
117 In 1979, there were approximately 95,324,000 persons living as married
couples in the United States. U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENsus, DEP'r OF CoMxMcE,
SERES P-20, No. 352, HOuSEHOLD AND FAmLY CARnAcrmusrrcs: MARCH 1979,
Table A (1980). During the same year, there were approximately 2,692,000 unmar-
ried partners living in the United States. POPULATION PROFILE, supra note 1, at 8.
See note 1 supra.
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feasors liable for injuries to the consortium interests of both mar-
ried and unmarried partners.
B. Inordinate Expansion of Liability
A potentially more telling objection to extending loss of con-
sortium actions to unmarried cohabitants is the familiar rallying
cry that such a policy change would unduly expand the liability
of tortfeasors. Courts have regularly employed the fear of inordi-
nate expansion of tort liability as a rationale for denying consor-
tium rights to children whose parents have been injured by a
tortfeasor.1"8 This denial of consortium rights, by failing to pro-
vide recovery for plaintiffs with legitimate injuries, is arbitrarily
harsh and has been strongly criticized by many commentators. 1 9
Regardless of the wisdom of using the "inordinate expansion
of liability" argument to deny consortium rights to children, how-
ever, the claim of a deprived cohabitant is distinguishable on the
basis of numbers alone. 20 As the district court in Bulloch v.
United States'-21 noted, although an injured plaintiff may have a
large number of children,'2 an impaired cohabitant will be ac-
companied by at most only one deprived cohabitant, whether mar-
ried or not, who might sue the defendant on a loss of consortium
theory. 23 And, as the Bulloch court further observed, the number
of couples living in unmarried cohabitational relationships is rela-
tively small: of all the couples living together in the United States,
only three percent are unmarried.
2 4
' 8 See, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858,
138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
1 9 See, e.g., W. PNossER, supra note 5, at 896 & n.26.
120 But see Tong v. Jocson, 76 Cal. App. 3d 603, 605, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726, 727
(1977); Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165, 168 (Me. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1980).
121487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980).
122 For instance, the impaired mother in Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19
Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977), had nine children, each of
whom sued the defendants for $100,000. Id. at 445, 563 P.2d at 861, 138 Cal.
Rptr. at 305.
123 487 F. Supp. at 1086.
124 Id. (citing U.S. Bun xu or THE CENsus, DEa"T OF CommmcE, Smauns P-20,
No. 349, M r=AL STATUS AND IvNG ARnANGEMEnrs: MARCH 1979, at 3 (1980)).
This figure represents approximately 2.7 million people. Id.
By way of contrast, in March 1979 there were 62,389,000 children under
18 years of age in America, excluding those who were heads or spouses of
heads of families and subfamilies.... It seems obvious that the cost of
permitting children to bring suit [for loss of consortium] is very much
higher than the cost of permitting a cohabiting partner to bring suit
Id. 1086 (citation omitted). -
1981]
936 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Thus, although the granting of consortium rights to unmarried
cohabitants will undoubtedly increase the number of loss of con-
sortium actions brought, this increase, and the corresponding in-
crease in costs to society,2 5 will be relatively slight. Because an
unmarried deprived cohabitant frequently suffers injury identical
to that suffered by a deprived spouse, 20 this Comment argues that
this small expansion of tort liability is justified by its result.
C. Speculativeness and the Problem of Line Drawing
The most formidable tort-based policy problem in any loss of
consortium case is the speculative nature of the injury suffered.
Because the consortium doctrine concerns nonphysical injury to
intangible relational interests, problems of identifying those inter-
ests and of calculating the extent of actual loss suffered necessarily
arise. The real analytic problem in this context is not one of de-
termining damages once the plaintiff establishes that an injury to
consortium interests has occurred, because such damages, though
speculative, are closely akin to damages routinely awarded for mental
or emotional distress.127 Rather, the difficulty lies in making the in-
itial determination whether a relationship is sufficiently solid to
permit the jury to find any injury at all. One possible argument
for limiting legal protection of consortium rights to married couples
is the familiar one of the necessity for line drawing: Because the
establishment and computation of damages for loss of consortium
is necessarily speculative, the action should be restricted to married
persons. The line is drawn at the marital relationship because such
partners have taken their relationship sufficiently seriously to ex-
change marriage vows, thereby allowing one to conclude, with some
certainty, that impairment of one spouse will cause injury to the
deprived spouse. Such certainty is lacking in a nonmarital co-
habitational relationship, the argument continues, and therefore,
1
25 Increased litigation concerning consortium rights could possibly result in a
rise in insurance rates and increased administrative costs in the legal system. Cf.
Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d at 447, 563 P.2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr.
at 306 (explaining increased costs to society from granting children consortium rights
for injuries to parents).
12 6 See text following note 57 supra and note 130 infra.
127 Some courts have argued that damages for loss of consortium are too specu-
lative because of their intangible nature. See, e.g., Deshotel v. Atchinson, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958), overruled, Rodriguez v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
This argument, however, appears to have been employed more as an excuse for the
now discredited denial of consortium rights to wives; such problems arise in any
suit involving emotional or mental distress and have been adequately dealt with in
that context. See generally W. PnossE,, supra note 5, at § 54.
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the extension of consortium rights to such relationships will re-
quire courts to engage in difficult determinations to ascertain which
relationships are sufficiently strong or stable to justify a finding of
actual injury to the deprived cohabitant. Thus, the argument runs,
in order to simplify the court's task, it is best to grant the loss of
consortium action only to married couples.
This argument has a certain surface appeal. Restricting legal
protection of consortium interests to married cohabitants would, at
least, conserve considerable judicial resources that would otherwise
be engaged in determinations that, admittedly, would often be quite
difficult. This "conservation," however, would come at the ex-
pense of unmarried deprived cohabitants who may have suffered
real injury. The complete denial of any possibility of compensa-
tion for genuine injury cannot be justified on the ground that it
will save judges from having to make difficult determinations.
28
Modem consortium rights include the right to enjoy the affection,
companionship, and psychological support that arise from intimate
personal relations.12 9 Certainly the associational interests protected
by loss of consortium actions can exist in both marital and non-
marital relationships containing elements of intimacy, stability, and
commitment. 30
Thus, the use of marriage as a conclusive presumption that
such interests exist is both under- and over-inclusive in its result:
unmarried deprived cohabitants with solid relationships will be
denied a cause of action for their injuries, while "deprived" spouses,
who may have no relationship with their partners at all, aside from
the title of husband and wife, will be granted standing to bring a
loss of consortium action.131 Such a presumption fails to recognize
128 In an analogous situation-the decision whether to extend consortium rights
to the wife-the California Supreme Court rejected the line-drawing argument out
of hand: "the alleged inability to fix definitions for recovery on the different facts
of future cases does not justify the denial of recovery on the specific facts of the
instant case; in any event, proper guidelines can indicate the extent of liability for
such future cases."' Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d at 403, 525
P.2d at 682, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 778 (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 731,
441 P.2d 912, 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 74 (1968)).
12 9 See text accompanying note 32 supra.
130 And, just as certainly, "[it seems obvious that a member of a cohabiting
couple can suffer identical damage to that suffered by a spouse when his or her
mate is injured." Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. at 1085 (citations
omitted).
131 As a paradigmatic example, compare an unmarried couple who have co-
habited for 25 years, sharing a home, raising children, and exhibiting all the signs
of intimacy, affection, companionship, and support that the consortium doctrine is
designed to protect, with a married couple who have lived apart (and perhaps with
other partners) for 10 years without any form of communication between them,
and with no intention of ever reuniting. Assume that one of the partners in each
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that the problem of speculativeness inheres in any loss of consortium
action, regardless of whether the cohabitants are married.
This Comment next turns to a more extensive analysis of the
speculativeness issue both in and out of the marital relationship.
1. Speculativeness Within the Marriage
Relationship 132
Traditionally, courts have dealt with the speculative nature of
consortium interests, and of damage to those interests, in an un-
satisfactory manner. The legal status of marriage has generally
served as a conclusive, per se presumption that the emotional bonds
and relational interests present within a particular relationship are
of sufficient quality to deserve the legal protection of the consortium
doctrine. 133 Similarly, proof of injury to the impaired spouse has
generally given rise to a presumption of injury to the deprived
spouse's consortium interest. These presumptions have occasion-
ally been extended to quite unjustifiable extremes, such as the re-
fusal to permit defendants to introduce evidence tending to show
that the plaintiff lacked any significant consortium interest, and
consequently, that the damage suffered by the deprived spouse was
negligible. 34 Fundamental tort principles mandate that compen-
of these relationships is injured tortiously and, as a result, suffers a change in
disposition for the worse and is rendered incapable of having sexual relations.
If the existence of a legal marriage is taken as the necessary and sufficient pre-
requisite for maintaining a loss of consortium action, then the "deprived" member
of the second couple will be permitted to sue for loss of consortium, though the
deprived member of the first couple will be denied such a right Further, the
"deprived" member of the second couple may even be able to collect substantial
damages in some states, despite the lack of any apparent consortium interest. See
notes 132-36 infra & accompanying text.
132The following subsection is based on the rather simplistic assumption that
the best interests of society and justice demand that plaintiffs in loss of consortium
actions be compensated only to the extent of actual damage suffered (calculated as
accurately as possible) and that, to this end, all otherwise admissible evidence
necessary to that calculation be introduced at the trial. This assumption is some-
what unrealistic, of course, as there may be countervailing policy reasons militating
against the introduction of certain evidence. Some of these considerations will be
addressed more fully below. See text following note 161 infra.
133 The validity of this presumption can, of course, be forcefully disputed,
especially in light of official government predictions that the proportion of marriages
ending in divorce may soon reach 40%. U.S. BuMAu oF THE CENsus, DxFrT oF
CommancE, SEaIs P-23, No. 84, DivoRcE, Cmw CusTODy AND CHiLD SupPORT I
(1979).
134 In Bedillion v. Frazee, 197 Pa. Super. Ct 20, 175 A.2d 905 (1961), rev'd,
408 Pa. 281, 183 A.2d 341 (1962), the defendant attempted to introduce evidence
that the impaired spouse was in the habit of dating men other than her husband as
often as three nights a week. Id. at 22-23, 175 A.2d at 907. The defendant's
purpose was to demonstrate that the deprived spouse had a reduced consortium
interest in his wife's company and therefore to limit the plaintiff's damage recovery-
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sation be limited to actual loss.13 5 In refusing to admit a defend-
ant's evidence relating to the particular circumstances of a plantiffs
personal relationship with an impaired spouse, and instead relying
on a presumption of injury from proof of legal marriage and proof
of injury to the impaired spouse, courts violate these fundamental
principles. 13 6
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, the Commonwealth's intermediate appellate
court, first stated the general rule for proving damages for loss of consortium:
When a husband sues for the loss of his wife's consortium he is not
obliged to prove the value of the loss in dollars and cents. The fact of
marriage to the [impaired] . . . spouse is itself enough to support a
finding for recovery because "in such cases jurors, endowed with at least
a modicum of common sense, may be supposed to have some knowledge
of ordinary affairs of life."
Id. at 23, 175 A.2d at 907 (quoting Kelley v. Mayberry Township, 154 Pa. 440,
448, 26 A. 595, 597 (1893)).
The court then noted that, in actions for criminal conversation, the defendant
has the right to introduce evidence of particular acts of the impaired spouse in
order to mitigate the damages. Analogously, the court concluded, defendants in
ordinary loss of consortium actions should also have the right to introduce evidence
relating to the quality of the deprived spouse's consortium interest in mitigation of
damages: "[Defendant] had a perfect right to bring out evidence to show that the
wife-plaintiff spent little of her time to comfort and aid her husband but in fact
worked in a hotel restaurant until midnight and then went on dates with other men
after that hour." Id. at 24, 175 A.2d at 907.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's statement of the
general rule, 408 Pa. at 288, 183 A.2d at 345, but then, without any stated rationale,
held that the rules for mitigating damages in the area of criminal conversation were
not applicable in loss of consortium actions and that the "evidence attempted to be
introduced on the morals of the . . . [impaired spouse] were not relevant or
proper in any attempt to mitigate damages for the loss of consortium due the
. . [deprived spouse]." Id. at 288-89, 183 A.2d at 345. Although the court
might have intended that its holding be limited to particularly blatant cases in
which arguably highly prejudicial evidence relating to the "morals" of the im-
paired spouse is sought to be introduced, its broad statement appears to make
irrebuttable the general presumption of damages that follows simple proof of
marriage to the impaired spouse.
Pennsylvania is not the only jurisdiction that appears to allow such a pre-
sumption of damages for spouses following proof of marriage. See, e.g., Metro-
politan St. R.R. v. Johnson, 91 Ga. 466, 471-72, 18 S.E, 816, 817 (1893) (wife's
services are special and need not be calculated in same way as a servant's services;
husbands whose wives do not perform manual labor are as entitled to "compensa-
tion from wrongdoers for causing inability to perform service" as husbands whose
wives do perform such labor; thus, "there need be no direct or express evidence of
the value of the wife's services, either by the day, week, month, or any other period
of time, or any aggregate sum."). But see Davis v. Blum, 70 A.D.2d 583, 584,
416 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58 (1979) (implying that it was permissible for defendant to
introduce evidence of plaintiffs alcoholism in order "to controvert the . . . [de-
prived spouse's] testimony as to the plaintiffs' exemplary home life on her loss of
services cause of action."); note 139 infra.
185 Otherwise, plaintiffs would receive a windfall, and defendants would be
unjustly required to compensate in excess of the harm they cause. In cases in
which the injury has been caused intentionally, or other flagrant circumstances
exist, of course, courts might permit awards in excess of actual damages as punitive
or exemplary damages. See generally W. Paossma, supra note 5, at 9-14.
186 "[N]either a cohabitant nor a spouse should be compensated through a tort
action for loss of consortium when the proximate cause of the loss is not the defend-
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Because married couples have differing levels of emotional
commitment, intimacy, personal interaction, and psychological sup-
port, calculation of the actual loss of consortium incurred through
a spouse's injury can be accomplished only by examining the par-
ticular personal relationship at issue.137 Such a process would in-
volve the introduction of evidence at trial by both parties concern-
ing the relational interest of the impaired and deprived spouses and
the consortium damage sustained. Such judicial scrutiny of marital
relationships could lead the jury to deny damages for loss of con-
sortium to those spouses whose relationships do not involve the
emotional commitment and companionship that is meant to be pro-
tected by the consortium doctrine. This analysis would also allow
mitigation of loss of consortium damages if the defendant proves
that the actual loss suffered by the plaintiff is less than would other-
wise be presumed.138
This suggested approach to loss of consortium suits brought by
a married partner finds some support in recent case law. For ex-
ample, several decisions have denied recovery to plaintiffs who failed
to introduce specific evidence concerning their marital relationship
ants tortious conduct, but rather discord in the relationship or the personal prefer-
ence of the people involved." Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. at 1088.
The reasoning of the court in Bedillion, see note 134 supra, has been criticized by
one student commentator. See Note, Mitigation of Damages for Loss of Consortium,
28 U. Prr. L. Rxv. 366 (1966). The author argues that a "defendant should be
permitted to show that prior to the injury there was a lack of conjugal regard and
affection between the spouses." Id. 366 (footnote omitted). Although the fact of
marriage is sufflcient to permit recovery and give rise to a presumption of loss of
consortium interests, the author notes that such evidence is relevant to the mitigation
issue, in that it demonstrates that the plaintiff's loss was not as great as presumed.
Id. 369-70. See also Comment, Consortium, 34 U.S.C. L. REv. 334, 341 (1961)
("All evidence of the actual relationship between the spouses should be admissible
in determining the value of the spouse's consortium.").
137 New York provides expressly that juries are entitled to contrast the quality
of the particular plaintiffs' marital relationship both before and after the injury to
the impaired spouse. The pattern jury instructions on damages for loss of con-
sortium are as follows:
In determining the amount of such damages you may, therefore, take
into consideration the nature and extent of the (husband's, wife's) services
and society prior to the incident, including (his, her) disposition, tempera-
ment, character and attainments; the interest (he, she) mainfested in (his,
her) home, the social life of (his, her) family and in the comfort, happi-
ness, education and general welfare of the members of the family; the
services (he, she) rendered in superintending the household, training the
children, assisting (his, her) spouse in the management of the business or
affairs in which the spouse was engaged, if any; (his, her) acts of affection,
love and sexual intercourse performed and the extent to which the injuries
(he, she) sustained in the incident incapacitated (him, her) from perform-
ing such services and providing such society after the incident.
Coua. ON PATTRN JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE ASS'N OF Sup. CT. JusncEs, 1 NEW
YoRn PArrmN JURy INsTRUCTIONs--Crvm f 2:315, at 671 (2d ed. 1974).
1 38 See Note, supra note 136.
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and the precise injurious effect that the negligent injury to their
spouses had on that relationship. 139 Appellate court opinions sus-
taining loss of consortium damage awards have looked to trial court
testimony concerning specific changes in an injured spouse's health
and disposition and the impact of such changes on the sexual rela-
tions, social and family life, household and childraising activities,
and personal interaction of the couple involved. 140 Such an inquiry
attempts to identify changes in the quality of the marriage itself
and impairment of the consortium interest in each particular rela-
tionship. The size of the damage awards in these cases has been set
according to the extent of the disruption of the marital relationship
by the impaired spouse's injury141 and according to the value that
139 Thus, modem courts have frequently upheld jury verdicts in favor of the
injured spouse while denying loss of consortium damages to the deprived plaintiff.
Although negligent injury to the impaired spouse was proven, loss of consortium
damages were denied because of the lack of evidence concerning the condition of
the marital relationship before and after the accident. See, e.g., City of Fairbanks
v. Smith, 525 P.2d 1095 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1974); Guiterrez v. Hobbs, 505 P.2d 1318
(Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Welsh v. Fowler, 124 Ga. App. 369, 183 S.E.2d 574 (1971);
Washington v. Jones, 386 Mich. 466, 192 N.W.2d 234 (1971); Armstrong v.
LeBlanc, 51 Mich. App. 652, 216 N.W.2d 79 (1974); Kucken v. Hygrade Food
Products Corp., 51 Mich. App. 471, 215 N.W.2d 772 (1974); Whitson v. Whiteley
Poultry Co., 11 Mich. App. 598, 162 N.W.2d 102 (1968); Hodges v. Johnson, 417
S.W.2d 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967); Christman v. Bailey, 38 A.D.2d 773, 774, 327
N.Y.S.2d 966, 967 (1972) (verdict of $12,000 awarded to husband for loss of con-
sortium held "grossly excessive" because, although both husband and wife testified
they had had no "marital relations" since wife's injury, "[tihere [was] no testimony
that the loss of consortium resulted from the accident nor is there any evidence as
to the pre-accident relationship."); Hinkle v. Hampton, 495 P.2d 117 (Okla. Sup.
Ct 1972).
140 E.g., Carpenter v. Koehring Co., 391 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (damage
award to wife not excessive given evidence of duties thrust on her because of hus-
band's injuries, change in husband's personality, and anticipated duration of situa-
tion); Morrison v. Ted Wilkerson, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 1319 (W.D. Mo. 1971)
($20,000 damage award to wife not excessive in light of constant attention required
of her and radical changes for the worse in her husband's personality); Dawdowyez
v. Quady, 300 Minn. 436, 220 N.W.2d 478 (1974) ($8,000 damage award to wife
not excessive in light of testimony on husband's argumentative disposition since the
injury and in light of rehabilitative care she provided); Tribble v. Gregory, 288
So. 2d 13 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1974) (evidence that the husband and wife no longer
had sexual relations, that the husband no longer assisted his wife, and that the
husband and wife were unable to participate in their usual social activities supported
jury's award of damages); Helming v. Dulle, 441 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1969)
(additional job taken by wife and resulting disruptive influence justify damage
award); Blond v. Overesch, 527 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (evidence that
husband's physical condition made him unable to do work he had done prior to the
accident supported $15,000 verdict for loss of consortium); Rocha v. New York, 77
Misc. 2d 290, 352 N.Y.S. 990 (Ct. Cl. 1974) ($50,000 damage award to wife
justified because of her spouse's need for constant care and for loss of sexual
partnership).
141 United States v. Varner, 400 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1968) (affirming damage
award that limited loss of consortium recovery to 20 years although life expectancy
was 35 years because of trial judge's belief that conditions disrupting the marriage
would diminish with time); Grasle Elec. Co. v. Clark, 525 P.2d 1081 (Alaska Sup.
Ct. 1974). In Sullivan v. Lowell & Dracut St. Ry., 162 Mass. 536, 39 N.E. 185
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the plaintiff, as a unique individual, placed on the intimate aspects
of married life.142
Thus, the most logical assessment of loss of consortium claims
by married partners should focus on the quality and conditions of
each individual couple's marital relationship, both before and after
the relevant accident. Only by hearing the testimony of both sides
can such an inquiry be made fairly. Relying solely on the testi-
mony of the plaintiff-or worse, relying on an irrebuttable presump-
tion of injury as a substitute for any inquiry-provides little hope
for consistently accurate damage awards.
2. Speculativeness Outside the Marriage Relationship
The summary denial of consortium rights to unmarried co-
habitants is equally illogical. Nonmarital unions, like marital ones,
include a broad spectrum of personal arrangements that vary widely
in their nature.143 When the legal status of marriage is used as the
sole basis for allowing consortium rights, the results are in-
equitable.144 In short, marital status is a crude and unsatisfactory
indicator of the type of personal relationship in which the plain-
tiff is involved and, therefore, is an inadequate basis on which to
evaluate the value of any loss of consortium.
This Comment proposes that the right to prove damages for
loss of consortium be extended to all unmarried cohabitants. The
fact of cohabitation itself guarantees a certain associational stability
(1895), Justice Holmes affirmed the trial judge's ruling allowing the defendant to
introduce evidence of the plaintiff's past relationship with his wife in mitigation of
damages for loss of consortium. Holmes upheld the admissibility of such evidence
apparently because it tended to show "such relations between husband and wife as
indicated that the husband did not avail himself of the companionship and society
of the wife, the loss of which was alleged . . . ; and the judge in his charge
instructed the jury to regard it only as bearing on the question of damages." Id.
538 (not part of official opinion and not reprinted in parallel citation).
142 ThiU v. Modem Erecting Co., 292 Minn. 80, 193 N.W.2d 298 (1971)
(upholding loss of consortium award of $100,000 in part because of the extreme
importance of married life to the plaintiff as an individual).
14a Unmarried cohabitationa relationships range from casual sexual encounters
to stable, enduring arrangements that encompass all of the basic attributes of a
marital union. Oldham, The Effect of Unmarried Cohabitation by a Former Spouse
upon His or Her Right to Continue to Receive Alimony, 17 J. FAM. L. 249, 252
(1978-79). Cf. Beck, Nontraditional Lifestyles and the Law, 17 J. FAm. L. 685,
686-93 (1978-79) (prevalence of de facto marriages-relationships that endure for
an indefinite period of time and function as a family unit); Bruch, Property Rights
of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers' Services,
10 FAm. L.Q. 101, 102 & n.6 (1976) (noting that informal marriages often outlast
legally recognized marriages); Macklin, Heterosexual Cohabitation Among Unmarried
College Students, 21 FAM. COORINxAToR 463, 467-68 (1972) (describing non-
enduring intimate relationships).
4 See note 131 supra & accompanying text.
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and gives rise to a reasonable presumption that some substantial
emotional commitment has arisen from the intimacy of daily asso-
ciation. This presumption justifies recognition of a cause of action
for loss of nonmarital consortium. Such an alteration in current
decisional law will enable unmarried deprived cohabitants to in-
troduce evidence at trial concerning the characteristics of their re-
lationships and the precise injurious effect of their partners' injuries
on their relational interests. Because these issues are identical to
those that are explored (or should be explored) in marital con-
sortium suits, 45 nonmarital suits should impose no unique, analytic
burden on the judicial system.
As is the case with deprived spouses,146 loss of consortium
awards should be limited to those deprived cohabitants who ac-
tually suffer loss. To ensure this result, courts should carefully
scrutinize the relationship between the deprived and impaired co-
habitant in exactly the same way it has been argued that they should
examine the marital relationship of a deprived spouse suing for
loss of consortium.1 47 This examination would require the de-
prived cohabitant to introduce evidence concerning the quality
of his or her cohabitational relationship; the defendant would then
be permitted to introduce evidence tending to minimize the plain-
tiff's claim of a damaged consortium interest.14 Such close judi-
cial scrutiny' 49 will enable courts to distinquish between casual
sexual affairs and those nonmarital relationships that contain those
interests that the consortium doctrine is designed to protect. Thus,
such an approach will lead to a denial of damage awards to those
unmarried cohabitants whose relationships do not embrace the
1 4 5 See notes 139-42 supra & accompanying text; 41 AM. Jun. 2d Husband and
Wife §455 (1968); 3 Am. Jur. PROOF OF FACTS Damages Proof No. 37 (1959)
(expenses resulting from injury to wife and loss of consortium).
146 See text accompanying notes 134-38 supra.
1 4 7 See text accompanying note 138 supra.
148 See text accompanying notes 134-38 supra.
149 Any such judicial scrutiny would necessarily take place on a case by case
basis, as each relationship is unique. A variety of circumstances might be con-
sidered by the court in making its determination. In an analogous situation, that
of determining whether a former spouse has a particular relationship with a third
party to justify terminating his or her right to continue receiving alimony, one author
suggests some considerations that might be useful to discuss in deciding "whether
the relationship was the functional and emotional equivalent of marriage." Oldham,
supra note 143, at 262. These considerations include the amount of trust and con-
fidentiality in the relationship, use of the same surname, whether the couple "holds
themselves out" as husband and wife, whether they decide to conceive a child, the
length of the relationship, and whether the couple pool their resources. Id. Of
these considerations, the author appears to consider the last three to be the most
relevant-particularly the last two, which he incorporates into a suggestion for em-
ploying a rebuttable presumption that a "de facto marriage" exists in the presence
of certain circumstances. Id. 262, 263.
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commitment, companionship, support, and affection recognized and
protected by the consortium doctrine. 150
It might be argued that the consortium interests of unmarried
cohabitants are less deserving of protection-and damage to those
interests more speculative-because the unmarried cohabitational
relationship is less permanent than marriage. Thus, the argument
might continue, an unmarried cohabitant might be more likely to
leave an injured partner-and, consequently, suffer less harm-than
would a similarly situated spouse. This argument is based on
overbroad generalizations about both marriage and unmarried co-
habitation, and, even if accepted as accurate, cannot justify a com-
plete denial of consortium rights to unmarried cohabitants. Chang-
ing cohabitational practices, both inside and outside of marriage,
highlight this point. Although marriage once might have been
presumed to be an eternal bond between partners, recent statistics
disclose that nearly forty percent of all marriages now end in di-
vorce. 151 Thus, the marriage vows no longer lead to any reasonable
certainty of relational permanence. Further, nonmarital unions
often display the elements of permanence and stability that are
commonly associated with legal marriage.
152
In any case, the conceptual link between post-injury stability
of a relationship and the size of the loss of consortium damage
award is not clearly established even in the case of suits by married
partners. Courts faced with the difficulty of determining the proper
amount of damages to award for continuing, post-trial loss of con-
sortium have taken two different approaches. Some courts, without
discussing the longevity of either the particular marriage at issue
or of the "average" marriage, have used a life expectancy standard
to calculate marital consortium damages,153 revealing an underly-
150 Judge Ackerman had no doubt that courts would be capable of making such
distinctions:
I do not believe that my decision today [granting consortium rights to
an unmarried cohabitant] will lead to a vast amount of frivolous litigation
whenever an injured party has engaged in a fleeting escapade. I have con-
fidence that judges and juries are capable of separating wheat from chaff
and that the bar is sufficiently aware of this fact to prevent its wasting
time with frivolous claims.
Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. at 1088.
151 See note 133 supra & accompanying text.
152 See note 143 supra.
153 See, e.g., Carpenter v. Koehring Co., 391 F. Supp. 206, 213 (E.D. Pa.
1975) ('"The trial occurred when . . [the impaired spouse] was 48 years old and
had a life expectancy of 24.7 years .. .. Since [the deprived spouse's] life expect-
ancy was slightly over 30 years, we may assume for the purposes of this opinion
that they will have 24.7 more years of married life."); Metropolitan St. R.R. v.
Johnson, 91 Ga. App. 466, 18 S.E. 816 (1893).
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ing presumption that the relationship will endure until the death of
one spouse. Other decisions, however, have awarded damages to
plaintiffs who prove that their marriage has been completely de-
stroyed by the impaired spouse's injury but who do not intend to
remain married. 154 The total deterioration of the marital relation-
ship is held by this second group of courts to evidence the value of
the loss of consortium to the deprived spouse. This approach too
is probably based on the presumption that the plaintiffs' marriage
would have continued but for the tortious injury to the impaired
spouse.
Under current consortium doctrine, the presumption of life-
long marriage with one partner is an irrebuttable one. Yet, as dis-
cussed above, the divorce rate has reached a level sufficient to cast
doubt on the validity of that presumption. Its continued applica-
tion can be justified only as a result of the following logical argu-
ment: Application of the presumption raises the possibility of a
windfall to a loss of consortium plaintiff who becomes divorced or
separated from his or her impaired spouse; permitting the defend-
ant to introduce evidence that convinces a jury that damages should
be lower than they would otherwise be with the presumption
guarantees the defendant a windfall as the impaired spouse's next
partner would have no standing to recover any damages at all.155
Thus, the current application of an irrebuttable presumption
in favor of life-long marriage is justified as a mechanism that de-
prives culpable defendants of windfalls even though it might some-
times lead to windfalls for plaintiffs in unstable marriages. The
courts' current willingness to ignore the effect of the post-injury
instability of a marriage on policy grounds supports this Comment's
argument that post-injury instability of unmarried cohabitational
arrangements is no reason to deny loss of consortium claims to such
partners. This argument is even more plausible given the more
15 4 Thus, in Grasle Elec. Co. v. Clark, 525 P.2d 1081 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1974),
the court affirmed a verdict in favor of the wife for loss of consortium resulting
from injuries to her husband. The court noted that there was evidence that the
plaintiffs "were maritally well-adjusted prior to the accident," id. 1084, but that,
after the accident, "the marital relationship was destroyed." Id. Shortly after the
accident, the plaintiffs' marriage had deteriorated to the point where they had
separated, on the advice of their psychiatrist, who "was afraid that one would use
deadly or maiming force on the other." Id. 1082. At the time of the trial, the
couple attempted to effect a reconciliation, but apparently failed. Id. 1083. Despite
the apparent lack of any possibility of a continuing marital relationship, the court
affirmed the jur's award of $44,000 damages to the wife for loss of consortium.
The court did note, however, that the defendant's brief had not addressed the issue
whether the damage award should be reduced because the plaintiffs had separated.
Id. 1082.
155 See notes 46-55 supra & accompanying text.
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comparable stability that now exists in married and unmarried rela-
tionships.'5 6
In sum, the legal distinctions in consortium doctrine between
marital and nonmarital unions should be abandoned. Consortium
rights should be granted to any adult couple cohabiting as a dis-
crete family unit. Courts should then focus on the factual circum-
stances and characteristics of each relationship'in order to determine
whether any actual loss of consortium has been suffered by the plain-
tiff. In cases in which no provable loss has been sustained, because
of the pre-existing character of the personal relationship, loss of con-
sortium damages should be denied. The decision whether to award
loss of consortium damages, however, should be based not on mari-
tal status but on the facts developed at trial. Only this individual-
ized scrutiny of the personal relationships involved will effectuate
the general tort policy of providing compensation for actual loss of
consortium, inside or outside of a marital relationship.
IV. A PROPOSED PROCEDURE
The decision by the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey in Bulioch v. United States 15 appears to be
unique in its holding that unmarried cohabitants have an action
for loss of consortium. 5 8 In all other jurisdictions, an unmarried
deprived cohabitant would be automatically denied standing to
bring a loss of consortium action, as marriage is deemed to be a
required element of a loss of consortium claim. Procedurally, there-
fore, an unmarried deprived cohabitant who filed an action alleging
loss of consortium would be nonsuited on the defendant's filing of a
demurrer or other equivalent motion. 59
It appears that, in some jurisdictions, a married deprived co-
habitant is entitled to a presumption of substantial damages to the
consortium interest.1 0 In some instances, this presumption has
been carried to the point of denying the defendant the opportunity
to introduce evidence concerning the quality of the plaintiff's rela-
156 See note 143 supra.
157 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.NJ. 1980).
158 See notes 41 & 42 supra & accompanying text
159 In federal court, the defendant would, pursuant to FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)
(6), file a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted." See 2A J. MoonE & J. LucAs, Moonx's FEDm. PRAcTic E 12.08 (2d
ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as MooRE's].
160 See note 134 supra & accompanying text.
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tionship in order to mitigate damages.'' This Comment proposes
a procedure in which both of these inflexible presumptions will be
changed.
The procedure proposed below will not, and is not intended to,
equalize the status of unmarried cohabitants and married couples.
The proposed procedure addresses the twin inequities of (1) com-
pletely denying unmarried cohabitants a cause of action for loss of
consortium, and (2) permitting married couples to recover damages
for loss of consortium in cases in which no consortium interest has
been shown to exist and in which the defendant might have evi-
dence showing that no such interest actually did exist. After these
concerns are addressed, however, there might still be reasons to re-
tain some presumption in favor of married couples.
First, although specific instances can always be found to con-
tradict this general rule, it is probable that, on the average, married
cohabitants are more likely to have a consortium interest than
unmarried cohabitants. Further, whatever interest married couples
do have is likely to be greater than that of unmarried cohabitants.
Thus, granting some evidentiary presumptions in favor of married
cohabitants will tend to conserve the resources of both the parties
and the judiciary. These presumptions must be rebuttable, how-
ever, so that the likelihood of injustice is minimized in those cases
in which the assumptions on which the presumptions are based do
not hold true.
1 2
Second, although the state interest in favor of legal marriage
is not sufficiently strong to justify a complete denial of a loss of
consortium action for all unmarried cohabitants,es the state's in-
terest might be sufficiently strong to justify retaining some presump-
tions in favor of married plaintiffs.
Finally, courts have sometimes exhibited an unwillingness to
probe into the details of a marital relationship.16 The use of cer-
tain presumptions in favor of married couples would tend to mini-
mize the need for such probing, without creating unjust results.
111 See, e.g., Bedillion v. Frazee, 408 Pa. 281, 183 A.2d 341 (1962). See also
notes 134-36 & accompanying text.
102 Courts have exhibited a strong preference, sometimes articulated as a con-
stitutional requirement, for rebuttable, as opposed to irrebuttable, presumptions.
See, e.g., Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Schlesinger v. State of Wisconsin,
270 U.S. 230 (1926); Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 449 F.2d 235
(5th Cir. 1971).
16
3 See text accompanying notes 107-10 supra.
164See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1949)
("[Nlot all estrangements are final .... The common law avoided ... [a detailed
inquiry into the details of the marital relationship] by taking divorce as the only
test .... ).
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In light of these principles, this Comment's proposal is as fol-
lows: First, standing to bring a loss of consortium action should be
extended to unmarried cohabitants. Thus, a deprived partner who
alleges in the complaint that he or she cohabits with the impaired
partner could not be nonsuited owing to lack of a marital rela-
tionship.
Second, defendants should always be permitted to introduce
relevant evidence 165 concerning the quality of the plaintiffs' rela-
tionship prior to the occurrence of the injury that is the basis of the
impaired cohabitant's claim. 166
Third, in the case of married deprived plaintiffs, a rebuttable
presumption that a consortium interest does exist should be em-
ployed. In the case of unmarried deprived cohabitants, a rebuttable
presumption that no consortium interest exists should be em-
ployed. The result of the presumption in favor of married plain-
tiffs is that, unless the defendant introduces evidence tending to
disprove the existence of a consortium interest, the married plaintiffs
will be able to survive a summary judgment motion without having
to introduce any affidavits or other evidence demonstrating the
existence of a consortium interestY7  Unmarried plaintiffs, on the
other hand, will have to submit affidavits or other evidence in order
to survive a motion for summary judgment. 168
Fourth, the Comment proposes that married plaintiffs should
bear a lesser burden of proof in establishing the amount of damages
than their unmarried counterparts. This result could be accomp-
lished through the use of a formal presumption in favor of deprived
165 Of course, the general evidentiary rules of admissibility would still apply.
See FED. R. Ev-m. 401-403; 10 MooRE's, supra note 159, at §§ 400-403.
166 See notes 134-42 supra & accompanying text.
167 It is crucial to note that this rebuttable presumption differs significantly from
the irrebuttable presumption in favor of the existence of a consortium interest that
is frequently employed today. See note 133 supra & accompanying text. Further,
this presumption applies only to the existence of the consortium interest; damages
would not be presumed at this point. See notes 134-42 supra & accompanying text
and text following note 168 infra.
168 A likely further practical result of these presumptions is that married plain-
tiffs will be better able to settle, and for higher amounts, than will unmarried
plaintiffs. This is so because it will be easier, and therefore less expensive, for
married plaintiffs to get to trial and, conversely, because it will be more difficult,
and therefore more expensive, for a defendant to fight a loss of consortium case
brought by a married plaintiff. Because one important dimension of settlement
negotiations are the relative costs of the parties in actually trying the case, the
higher net cost to defendants opposing married plaintiffs should generate higher
settlement offers to married plaintiffs. See generally C. KARAss, THE NEGoTIAmaqG
GAME (1970); Mabry, The Pure Theory of Bargaining, 18 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv.
479 (1965); Note, An Analysis of Settlement, 22 STAN. L. REv. 67 (1969).
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spouses that damages exist.169 The presumption could come into
play after proof of injury to the impaired spouse.170 As a result of
this presumption, married plaintiffs would be required only to offer
evidence of the most general nature in order to prove damages; 171
unmarried plaintiffs would be required to introduce detailed, spe-
cific evidence of their damages.172 In reality, however, it is unlikely
that such a formal presumption is necessary because juries, in de-
termining damage awards, are likely to employ an informal pre-
sumption and require more evidence from unmarried plaintiffs in
any case. Thus, even in the absence of a legal presumption in favor
of finding damages for married plaintiffs, such plaintiffs will still
be able to recover the same damages as would unmarried plain-
tiffs even though the married plaintiffs' proof was less persuasive.7 3
Under this proposal, a demurrer will be insufficient to nonsuit
a deprived plaintiff who alleges either a marital or cohabitational
relationship with an impaired partner. Frivolous suits,174 however,
need not always go to full trial; many of these will be weeded out
before trial by the equivalent of a motion for judgment on the
S69 This Comment's proposed presumption is a rebuttable one, as distinguished
from the irrebuttable presumption of damages employed in some jurisdictions. See
notes 134-38 supra & accompanying text.
170 See, e.g., Murphy v. Durmiai, 36 A.D.2d 556, 317 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1971)
(wife, as result of automobile accident, suffered spasms of trapezius muscles, and
cervical and lumbosacral sprain; court affirmed award of $1500 loss of consortium
damages to husband: "The deprivation of some marital association by the husband
can be inferred reasonably from the wife's infirmities." Id. at 556, 317 N.Y.S.2d at
586) (citation omitted). See generally Comment, Presumed Damages for Fourth
Amendment Violations, 129 U. PA. L. REBv. 192, 195-96, 202-07 (1980).
171 As always, the defendant would be free to offer evidence to rebut the plain-
tiff's claim of damages. See notes 165 & 166 supra & accompanying text.
172 Of course, the evidence required to establish damages would be much the
same as that offered to prove the existence of a consortium interest.
173 It is further suggested, however, that regardless of whether married plaintiffs
are afforded a formal presumption of damages, or merely benefit from the jury's
informal presumption of damages, it will still, in most cases, be in those plaintiffs'
best interests to introduce specific evidence on the amount of damage. This would
be particularly true if there were special circumstances in the marital relationship-
of which the jury might not otherwise be aware-that tended to increase the amount
,of the harm caused to the consortium interest. Thus, for example, in order to
increase the size of their award, deprived spouses might wish to introduce evidence
that the impaired spouse was an unusually caring person or that the impaired spouse
-was unusually helpful around the house. On the other hand, if the couple were
extremely jealous of their privacy, and if the defendant offered no evidence in
mitigation of damages, they might prefer simply to rest on the presumption-
whether formal or informal-and take their chances with the jury. The existence
of a presumption gives them this option, not available to unmarried plaintiffs, and
is entirely consistent with the judicial unwillingness to probe unnecessarily into the
,details of a marital relationship. See note 164 supra & accompanying text
17 4 See note 150 supra & accompanying text.
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pleadings 175 or a motion for summary judgment.170 Suits that sur-
vive these motions will go to full trial at which the jury will be in-
structed about the presumptions on the existence of consortium
interests and on damage to consortium interests, and it will render
its verdict accordingly.
177
To illustrate the operation of this Comment's proposal, four
hypothetical examples will be considered below. 178 In each case,
the male member of the couple has been injured in an automobile
accident caused solely by the defendant's negligence. The results
of the accident, in each case, are that the injured man has become
permanently paralyzed from the neck down, thus rendering him
incapable of having sexual relations or of performing any work.
Further, as a result of the injuries, each man has become extremely
irritable and, consequently, difficult to get along with. All suits
occur in federal court and the plaintiff requests a jury trial in each
case.
A. Couple A: Married, No Consortium Interest
Andy and Amy have been married for twenty-five years. They
have no children. After ten years of marriage, they began to quar-
rel frequently and eventually agreed to separate. For the last ten
years they have been living apart. During those ten years, the only
communication they have had was a telephone call on the day
before Andy's accident, when they decided to contact their respec-
tive attorneys and instruct them to institute divorce proceedings.
After Andy was injured, he filed suit against the defendant; Amy
also filed suit against the defendant, alleging that she is married to
Andy and that she has suffered a loss of consortium.
Defendant, through discovery, learns of the true relationship
between Andy and Amy. He moves to dismiss her claim for failure
to state a claim. 79 This motion is denied because Amy has alleged
in her complaint that she is married to Andy. Defendant then files
17 5 See FED. R. Cv. P. 12(c); 2A Moons's, supra note 159, at 1 12.15.
17 6 See FED. B. Crv. P. 56; 6 Moo E's, supra note 159, at 1111 56.01-.27.
177 Of course, there may not always be a jury trial, or if there is, the judge
might grant a directed verdict, see FE. R. Civ. P. 50(a); 5A MoonE's, supra note
159, at 111f 50.02-.06, in favor of one of the parties. In either case, the judge should
employ the same presumptions with respect to existence of a consortium interest and
damage to that interest. Likewise, the judge should follow these presumptions in
ruling on a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, see FM. R. CrV. P.
50(b); 5A MooRE's, supra note 159, at H 50.07-.13, or its equivalent.
178 Each of the hypotheticals is an extreme case chosen to demonstrate some
aspect of the procedure discussed above. Variations are discussed in the footnotes.
17 9 See FED. B. Crv. P. 12(b) (6); note 159 supra.
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his answer and moves for a judgment on the pleadings 180 or he
files additional affidavits and moves for summary judgment.1ft At
this point, Amy's claim should be dismissed, as it is patently friv-
olous; her relationship with Andy exihibits none of the values that
the consortium doctrine is designed to protect.
3 2
B. Couple B: Unmarried, No Consortium Interest
Bob and Barb met in a bar the night before Bob's accident oc-
curred. They had several drinks together and then went to Barb's
home, where they engaged in sexual relations. After the accident,
Barb joined her loss of consortium claim to Bob's suit for damages.
In her complaint, Barb alleged that she cohabits with Bob.
In this case, the defendant does not bother to file a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim; he knows that such a motion
would be denied, as Barb has alleged in her pleadings that she co-
habits with Bob. Defendant does, however, make a motion for
judgment on the pleadings or for summary judgment after his
answer. Barb's case, like Amy's in the preceding example, is
wholly devoid of merit and her claim should be dismissed at this
stage of the proceedings.
C. Couple C: Married, Strong Consortium Interest
Christopher and Christine have been married for twenty-five
years. They have raised two children together and manage all their
assets jointly. After Christopher's accident, the two file suit against
the defendant. Christopher seeks damages for the injuries he has
sustained; Christine seeks damages for her loss of consortium. In
her portion of the complaint, Christine merely alleges that she is
Christopher's wife and that, as a result of the injuries Christopher
has sustained, she has suffered loss of consortium damages.
The defendant files a motion to dismiss Christine's complaint
for failure to state a claim; this motion is denied. The defendant
then files his answer. The case goes to trial, and after Christopher
testifies about the nature of his injuries, the defendant moves for
summary judgment on Christine's loss of consortium claim. The
defendant is unable to introduce any evidence showing that Chris-
tine did not have a consortium interest in Christopher, and
180 See FE. B. Crv. P. 12(c); note 175 supra.
181 See FED. B. Civ. P. 56; note 176 supra.
182 See, e.g., note 132 supra & accompanying text.
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Christine, who is an intensely private person, chooses to rely on the
rebuttable presumption proposed by this Comment that a con-
sortium interest exists between married couples. She too offers no
evidence, and the judge denies the defendant's motion for summary
judgmentlas
During the damage phase of the trial, Christine testifies merely
that she and Christopher had had a happy marriage up until the
time of the accident; that they had rarely quarreled; that they had
enjoyed "normal" sexual relations, and that they had shared the
household chores. Her attorney then recites some of Christopher's
testimony that, since the accident, the couple often quarreled, could
no longer enjoy sexual relations, and were unable to share the
household chores. The attorney asks Christine if she agrees with
this testimony; she states her assent. She offers no more specific
evidence about the injury to her consortium interest 184 and the
defendant offers no evidence in rebuttal. 185
The judge then instructs the jury that there is a rebuttable
presumption that a consortium interest exists between Christopher
and Christine and gives it the appropriate instruction on computing
Christine's damages, should it determine that she has prevailed on
the issue of liability.186 The jury returns with a verdict for Christo-
pher on his claim and for Christine on hers. Christine is awarded
$10,000 for her loss of consortium. The defendant appeals this
award, contending that it is too high considering the general nature
of the evidence Christine offered on the extent of her loss of con-
sortium. The court of appeals affirms, holding that Christine did
offer sufficient evidence to support the jury's award.
183 Of course, the defendant could have offered evidence tending to negate the
existence of any consortium interest thereby rebutting this Comment's proposed pre-
sumption. Then Christine would have had to introduce evidence to survive the
summary judgment motion.
184 Christine's attorney had advised her that, as a married plaintiff, this was
the minimum evidence she could offer in the damage phase of the trial, absent evi-
dence by the defendant tending to mitigate the amount of her damages. The
attorney had also strongly suggested that she offer more specific proof of her loss;
she declined to follow this advice, however, because of the high value she places on
her privacy, and because she abhorred the thought of testifying about the particulars
of her private marital relationship.
185 The defendant obviously could have offered rebuttal evidence, which might
have made it necessary for Christine to introduce more specific evidence.
186 If this jurisdiction recognizes a formal presumption in favor of finding dam-
ages for the deprived spouse's loss of consortium, one of the advantages for married
couples contained in this Comment's proposal, see notes 169-72 supra & accompany-
ing text, the judge would instruct the jury about this presumption; otherwise, the
judge would simply tell the jury that they could award whatever damages seemed
appropriate considering all the evidence. Even under this latter option, married
partners would appear to have an advantage over unmarried cohabitants. See note
173 supra & accompanying text.
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D. Couple D: Unmarried, Strong
Consortium Interest
Don and Donna have lived together for fifteen years. They
are unmarried. They own a house jointly. Both work and they
put their earnings into a joint bank account. After the couple had
cohabited for several years, they decided to have a child; when
their son was born, Donna took a two-year maternity leave from
work. She then returned to her job and Don took a two-year
paternity leave from his job. After Don returned to work, the
two arranged their schedules so that they could spend the maximum
amount of time with their son and with each other. Donna uses
Don's surname, as does their son.
After the accident, Don and Donna file suit against the de-
fendant. In her portion of the complaint, Donna alleges that she
cohabits with Don and that she has suffered loss of consortium as
a result of Don's injuries. The defendant files his answer and moves
for a judgment on the pleadings with respect to Donna's claim. At
this point, because the Comment's proposal employs a rebuttable
presumption that unmarried plaintiffs have no consortium interests,
Donna is obliged to introduce evidence, by way of affidavit, that
she does indeed have a legally cognizable consortium interest in
Don. This evidence will go beyond the allegations of the pleadings;
the judge will therefore treat the defendant's motion as one for
summary judgment.187 The defendant offers no evidence to sug-
gest that Donna's claim of a consortium interest is false; the judge,
satisfied that Donna has rebutted the presumption, denies the de-
fendant's motion. But the unmarried plaintiff has already been
put to a greater burden than Christine, the married plaintiff in a
comparable position.
At trial, the defendant offers no evidence to show that Don and
Donna did not share a consortium interest.1 8 Don and Donna,
however, both testify extensively about the quality of their rela-
tionship both before and after Don's accident. The judge, at the
close of the trial, charges the jury that there is a presumption,
which Donna has the burden of rebutting, that Don and Donna do
not share a consortium interest. The judge further instructs the
jury that, if it finds that Donna has suffered some loss of consor-
tium, it should award damages based on the evidence given.189 The
18 7 See FED. B. Civ. P. 12(c); note 175 supra.
188 Once again, the defendant would be entitled to introduce evidence tending
to negate the existence of a consortium interest. See note 183 supra.
189 Depending on the jurisdiction, the judge would simply instruct the jury to
award damages based either on the specific evidence presented by the plaintiff or
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jury returns a verdict in favor of both Don and Donna and awards
Donna $10,000 for her loss of consortium. The defendant appeals
this award, but the court of appeals affirms, finding that the evi-
dence offered at trial supports the size of the award.
CONCLUSION
Taking the lead from Judge Ackerman's pioneer decision in
Bulloch v. United States,190 this Comment has proposed that con-
sortium rights be extended to unmarried cohabitants. This ex-
tension follows logically from the trend-in both the United States
Supreme Court and in various state courts-towards increased judi-
cial recognition of nontraditional domestic relationships. An analy-
sis based on tort law principles likewise supports such an extension.
Finally, this Comment proposed a procedure whereby consortium
rights could be granted to unmarried cohabitants without under-
cutting the state interest in the institution of marriage.
to award whatever damages seemed appropriate considering all the evidence. See
text following note 172 supra. In any case, the advantageous presumption of
damages available for married loss of consortium plaintiffs, see note 186 supra, would
not be available for the unmarried cohabitant.
190 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980).
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